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INTRODUCTION
Dina Fakoussa
Jordan’s stability is severely challenged by socio-eco-
nomic hardship. The country is plagued by high un-
employment rates, an alarming debt-to-GDP ratio of 
around 94 percent, corruption, and dismal social ser-
vices. The fight against terrorism has also resulted 
in further infringement of rights such as freedom of 
expression. These grievances have led to a series of 
protests and strikes in the past two years; the lat-
est strike by teachers has had a far-reaching impact 
on the public. The fact that people continue to take 
to the streets despite reform attempts by the gov-
ernment casts doubts about the Kingdom’s ability to 
weather the storm of anger and frustration accumu-
lated over years. 
The country’s strained economic and social situation 
is further aggravated by conflicts in its neighborhood 
and regional dynamics. The influx of around 1.2 mil-
lion Syrian refugees has come with a significant eco-
nomic, social, and political burden. The civil war in 
Syria and insecurity in Iraq, as a result of the rise 
of the so-called Islamic State, have also necessitat-
ed the closure of borders and hence existential trade 
routes for the kingdom. Additional pressure comes 
from the assertive policies of regional powers such 
as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
who expect alignment from Jordan vis-à-vis Iran and 
Qatar. Jordan’s dependence on financial aid from the 
Gulf further narrows its room for maneuver when it 
is politically at odds with these powers. And finally, 
the fact that a two-state solution to the Israel-Pales-
tine conflict seems off the table and abandoned by a 
key ally of the Kingdom, namely the US, is of utmost 
concern for a country that is home to the largest Pal-
estinian refugee community worldwide. 
For Europe, including Germany, Jordan represents 
a moderate Middle Eastern country whose relative 
stability needs to be safeguarded as the state’s foun-
dation seems increasingly shaky and the number of 
countries in the region pursuing balanced policies 
guided by diplomacy and political solutions rath-
er than military answers to conflicts is decreasing. 
Besides, the Kingdom is home to a disproportional-
ly high number of Syrian and Palestinian refugees, a 
burden acknowledged and addressed in terms of aid 
from the Europeans. To be certain, the driver of aid 
is also the fear of rising internal tensions and conse-
quently new refugee waves reaching Europe.
These multiple challenges are addressed in this col-
lection of papers. The authors were participants in 
the workshop series “Promotion of Think Tank Work 
on Socio-Economic Reforms and the Impact of Re-
gional Dynamics on Jordan,” held in Berlin in Sep-
tember and in Jordan in November 2019. The work-
shops were conducted as part of DGAP’s project on 
strengthening think tanks and similar institutions in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and 
Europe.
Among the recommendations are the following: to 
address the issue of unemployment, the successful 
and fast-growing Jordanian Information and Com-
munications Technology (ICT) sector should ex-
plore ways to generate more work opportunities. 
This should take place in an enhanced environment 
for entrepreneurship regarding networking, support 
for innovation and sustainable ideas, and research 
as well as data collection and availability. When it 
comes to enhancing female unemployment, more 
childcare facilities, equal pay, and fighting social 
norms hostile to women’s employment are deemed 
core. Additionally, continued funding for employ-
ment programs targeting Syrian refugees and the 
Jordanian host community should be ensured, while 
the outcome of such programs should be optimized 
by offering more sustainable qualification and em-
ployment opportunities. 
In the light of an increasing detachment of Jordani-
ans from their tribal origins, not least due the chang-
ing social fabric as a result of the presence of differ-
ent refugee populations and exiled Arabs, a reform 
of Jordan’s legal system, which continues to effec-
tively be a hybrid between state law and tribal jus-
tice practices, is recommended. Opinion polls on the 
role of tribal justice should be conducted to under-
pin and legitimize such legal reform efforts. Legal re-
form is also advocated in the realm of legislation that 
infringes on people’s right to freedom of expression, 
including the Jordanian Penal Code and anti-terror-
ism laws. 
In terms of regional dynamics, the Jordanian govern-
ment is advised to support the Iraqi government in 
its ambitions to integrate the Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF) into the Iraqi security architecture, 
while reaching out to Iran to discuss Iraq’s securi-
ty. As Jordan holds a more balanced position to-
wards Iran, and hence should be strengthened in the 
light of pressure from the Arab Gulf, Jordan should 
be integrated into the EU’s relations with Kuwait 
and Oman to augment the impact of aid as well as 
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to boost the Kingdom’s political weight in the region. 
Finally, the EU and its member states are urged to 
uphold the two-state solution, coordinate and strat-
egize with Jordan on the matter, and increase their 
support for Jordan’s economy and society while at-
taching political strings to their engagement to in-
duce necessary political reforms.  
The Contributions in Short:
 “Unlocking the Potential of Entrepreneurship in Cre-
ating Jobs for Youth in Jordan”: Hadeel Alqatamin ad-
dresses the issue of entrepreneurship in the boom-
ing Jordanian ICT sector and how the sector falls 
short of generating employment, despite initial prog-
ress. She suggests that one way out would be for en-
trepreneurs to focus on the sharing economy when 
designing concepts. In addition, she identifies gaps 
related to support units for sustainable business 
ideas, as well as opportunities for networking and 
solid research on entrepreneurship that need to be 
addressed.
“Unemployment among Jordanian Women”: Amani 
Al-Serhan discusses the paradox in the Jordanian la-
bor market where Jordan scores very high in terms 
of female education, yet women’s employment re-
mains lowest in regional comparison. She views the 
combat of counterproductive social norms, the cre-
ation of affordable and sufficient childcare facilities, 
as well as reforms to equal pay legislation, as funda-
mental to ensure equality and secure economic gains 
from active female participation in the labor market.  
“The Impact of Syrian Refugees’ Return to Syria on 
Employment Programs in Jordan”: Reine El Wer draws 
attention to the risks of defunding employment pro-
grams as a result of the return of Syrians to their 
homeland. She points out that the majority of Syri-
an refugees still reside in Jordan and that host com-
munities themselves have benefited from these pro-
grams. Therefore, she calls for a continuation of 
these schemes by international donors such as the 
World Food Program whilst ameliorating their quali-
ty to ensure more sustainable employment.
“Tribal Conflict Resolution in Jordan – A Pathway to-
wards Legal Policy in a Hybrid Setting”: Sarah Jakob 
highlights the hybrid legal order in Jordan comprised 
of tribal conflict resolution mechanisms as well state 
legislation. She argues that the social fabric in Jor-
dan has changed over the past years, decreasing the 
significance of tribal affiliation for certain groups. At 
the same time, tribal justice is still practiced and fa-
vorized by many Jordanians. Hence, she advocates 
for opinion polls on citizens’ perceptions in this 
realm upon which a balanced legal reform can be 
based, which eventually increases trust in the state.
“Freedom of Expression under the Interpretation of 
Jordanian Law”: Eman Alqaisi laments the vague-
ness of many Jordanian legal texts, including the Jor-
danian Penal Code, the Anti-Terrorism Law, and the 
Press and Publications Law. Their elastic phrasing al-
lows the state to curb freedom of expression, and to 
crack down on and criminalize journalists and activ-
ists. She calls for a national dialogue between rele-
vant governmental entities and other stakeholders 
such as human rights groups, civil society, and the 
media to protect and enlarge the space for freedom 
of expression.
“Pro-Iranian Militias at the Kingdom’s Doorstep – Im-
plications for Jordan’s Foreign Policy and Response 
Options”: Chonlawit Sirikupt explores Jordan’s poli-
cy options in the light of insecurity in Iraq emanating 
from Iranian-linked militias operating outside state 
control. The option he deems most feasible for Jor-
dan foresees supporting Baghdad’s integration of the 
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the state’s se-
curity architecture and cultivating dialogue with Te-
heran on Iraq’s security. 
“Amman and the GCC-Crisis – A Case for Enhanced 
EU Cooperation with Kuwait and Oman”: Antoni-
no Occhiuto makes the case for the EU to consid-
er Jordan in its policies towards Kuwait and Oman, 
the rationale being to ameliorate coordination of aid 
and support by the three actors to maximize impact 
on Jordan. At the same time, the Kingdom should be 
supported and strengthened in the face of political 
pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE for align-
ment in the case of Iran and Qatar.
“Trump’s Peace Plan and Jordan’s Woes”: Suha 
Ma’ayeh looks at the detrimental effects of US pol-
icy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jor-
dan. In her view, the EU must step up its economic 
and political support to Jordan to uphold the two-
state solution as well as to avoid socio-economic cri-
sis and instability in the country. However, she urges 
European countries to attach political strings to this 
support so that political reforms are carried out that 
would strengthen the country’s stability. 
Chapter I: Socio-
Economic Challenges and 
Reforms in Jordan
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UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CREATING 
JOBS FOR YOUTH IN JORDAN
Hadeel Alqatamin
Current business tendencies and the Jordanian gov-
ernment’s 2019/2020 priorities plan encourage entre-
preneurship as an important economic driver. In this 
regard, Jordan has seen many incubators and funding 
entities established to support youth entrepreneurship 
and boost youth employment. Yet, the unemployment 
rate has been increasing continuously in recent years. 
One specific aspect of startups which promises to boost 
job creation is their business model for the sector, 
which does not receive enough attention from the en-
trepreneurial ecosystem. Most entrepreneurship sup-
port programs (ESPs) focus on startup success and con-
tinuity regardless of impact in terms of job creation. In 
addition, most successful startups in Jordan fall within 
the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
sector, which is one of the weakest sectors in terms of 
job creation. Therefore, it is important to reconsider 
the startups’ business themes and structures from the 
early establishment stage to increase their effectivity 
in solving unemployment. One of the key solutions is to 
consider the ICT role in projects, with a special focus on 
the sharing economy. In addition, the entrepreneurship 
ecosystem in Jordan must be enhanced to support the 
development of successful business ideas, and more ef-
fective networking processes are needed to identify lo-
cal needs, customers, and business providers. Finally, 
more research work in this area is needed to develop 
plans based on comprehensive and useful data.
One of the key challenges in Jordan is the econom-
ic situation. Although governmental and internation-
al efforts are focused on fostering economic growth 
and job creation in the country, the unemployment 
rate is rising continuously, having reached 19 per-
cent during the first quarter of 2019 according to the 
national Department of Statistics.1 The unemploy-
1  “19.0 percent Unemployment Rate during the first Quarter of 2019,” Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2019 <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/
empuemp_2019q1/> (accessed December 2, 2019). 
2 “Jordan: Youth unemployment,” TheGlobalEconomy.com, 2019 <https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Jordan/Youth_unemployment/> (accessed 
December 2, 2019).
3 “Opportunities for youth in Jordan,” UNICEF, 2019 <https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/opportunities-youth-jordan> (accessed December 2, 2019).
4 “Government Priorities Plan 2019-2020” [in Arabic], Government of Jordan, 2019, pp. 56-60 <http://www.your.gov.jo/Government-Priorities-.pdf 
> (accessed December 2, 2019), and Adam Schiff et al., “Entrepreneurship environment assessment in Jordan,” Silatech Research and Policy Report, May 
2015, pp. 1-2 <https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/172490/Schiff, percent20Schmidt, percent20Troncoso- percent20Entrepreneurship 
percent20Assessment percent20in percent20Jordan percent20May.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed December 2, 2019).
5 “A study of youth choices towards entrepreneurship and the institutional environment in Jordan” [in Arabic], Higher Population Council, 2018 <https://
www.hpc.org.jo/sites/default/files/Study- percent20enhancing percent20enterperneurial percent20attitudes percent20- percent20AR.pdf> (accessed 
December 2, 2019).
6 “Accelerating Entrepreneurship in the Arab World,” World Economic Forum in collaboration with Booz & Company, October 2011 <http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_YGL_AcceleratingEntrepreneurshipArabWorld_Report_2011.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019).
7 “A study of youth choices towards entrepreneurship.”
ment rate is even higher among Jordanian youth un-
der the age of 30, who make up around 63 percent of 
the total population. According to the World Bank, 
youth unemployment in Jordan reached 36.7 percent 
in 2019.2 This situation threatens to exclude youth 
from contributing to Jordan’s economy and may push 
them to seek other opportunities abroad.3
Furthermore, Jordan suffers from high rates of pov-
erty and a reduction of living standards, in addition 
to a chronic increase in the budget deficit and the 
distribution of trade balance. All of these problems 
have led to a continuous decline in Jordan’s econom-
ic growth, which was 8.2 percent in 2007 and stood 
at only two percent in 2017. These economic strug-
gles have been complicated by the debt burden, re-
gional instability, and the unprecedented influx of 
refugees.4
Entrepreneurship as a Means to Boost the Econo-
my and Job Creation
Many cases worldwide have shown that entrepre-
neurship boosts job creation and supports local and 
global economies, creating direct gains for business 
owners and indirect gains for the community. In ad-
dition, entrepreneurship decreases imports, increas-
es exports, and enhances the gain of hard currency. 
Moreover, it raises the potential for founding small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs).5
To reduce unemployment rates in Jordan, many local 
and global stakeholders have supported youth entre-
preneurship to create new jobs. This approach has 
led to the introduction of many reforms to enhance 
the business environment, which enable entrepre-
neurs to start new companies easily and expand 
their businesses while boosting the national econo-
my.6 Nowadays, Jordan houses 208 entities that sup-
port entrepreneurship programs, including incuba-
tors, accelerators, business consultation centers, and 
research centers7 – all of which have resulted in a 
Chapter I: Socio-Economic Challenges and Reforms in Jordan
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considerable boom in the field of entrepreneurship.8 
Moreover, 98 percent of newly registered companies 
in the country are SMEs and startups, which gener-
ate more than fifty percent of private sector GDP and 
sixty percent of new employment opportunities.9
In an effort to attain an economic revival, the Jor-
danian government adopted a national development 
plan based on production and job creation. Accord-
ingly, the government has set the goal of support-
ing economic growth through entrepreneurship 
and trade as its top national priority, as stated in its 
2019/2020 priorities plan clause on the “Production 
State.” To this end, the government is committed to 
the following actions to support entrepreneurship: 
supporting small business owners and entrepre-
neurs by means of the Jordanian Entrepreneurship 
Fund, which will support 825 innovative projects (69 
million Jordanian dinar have been earmarked for this 
purpose); introducing eighty business incubators in 
Jordan’s governorates to spread entrepreneurial cul-
ture throughout the Kingdom; and allowing the leas-
ing of government land in the governorates to estab-
lish small investment projects.10
Regulatory Framework
Jordanian legislation does not define entrepreneur-
ship or startups in particular, considering them equal 
to SMEs. This means that startups are required to 
pay taxes and include their employees in social secu-
rity as if they were SMEs.11 Among entrepeneurs’ key 
complaints are paying taxes and social security con-
ditions. Having special exemptions – especially in the 
first years – is a popular demand among many. 
Consequently, until now, plans and strategies to de-
velop entrepreneurship have been included within 
those for SMEs. This is clearly shown in the main na-
tional strategy tackling the structure for developing, 
coordinating, implementing, and monitoring poli-
cies and programs for SMEs and entrepreneurship, 
the “2015-2019 National Entrepreneurship and SME 
Growth Strategy.” On the other hand, a new Ministry 
8 Emad Abu Ulfotoh, “Why did Jordan excell in Arab entrepreneurship?” [in Arabic], AlJazeera, July 4, 2017 <https://bit.ly/2UbJtgz> (accessed December 
2, 2019).
9 K. Samer and J. Mohamed, “Research study on strengthening small and medium enterprises in Jordan,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Jordanian 
Young Economists Society, 2014 <https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/253252/7_dokument_dok_pdf_41279_2.pdf/571a302c-7e84-7fdd-fa5b-
72d2ecc44e85?version=1.0&t=1539652585795> (accessed December 2, 2019).
10 “Government Priorities Plan,” pp. 56-60.
11 “A study of youth choices towards entrepreneurship.”
12 “Jordan ICT & ITES sector statistics 2018,” The Information and Communications Technology Association in Jordan, 2018 <http://intaj.net/wp-content/
Studies/2018.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019).
13 “Jordan Startup Ecosystem Survey Results,” Jordanian Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Digital Economy, January 16, 2019 <https://www.docdroid.
net/74PKBVN/jordan-startup-ecosystem-survey-results.pdf> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
14 “Top startups in Jordan to invest in,” Venture, April 23, 2019 <http://www.venturemagazine.me/2019/04/startups-in-jordan-to-invest-in/> (accessed 
December 2, 2019).
of Entrepreneurship and Digital Marketing was es-
tablished early this year. The Ministry is working on 
the first draft of a policy regulating entrepreneurship 
specifically as an independent business field. While 
this is a positive step, the organization of entrepre-
neurship in Jordan still needs more advanced and 
collaborative efforts between different stakeholders, 
especially in a complex business context where dif-
ferent governmental, private, and international enti-
ties interact. 
Dominant Entrepreneurial Sectors and Job 
Creation
Startups Based in the Information and Communi-
cation Technology (ICT) Sector 
Over the past five years, the ICT sector has grown 
exponentially by 37 percent in Jordan which, in turn, 
contributes significantly to the socio-economic de-
velopment of the country. In 2018, the ICT sector 
produced a total revenue of USD 749,116,414, repre-
senting a unique contribution to the total GDP. As 
a result, the government considers this sector one 
of the key drivers of economic development in the 
country and has developed favorable policies and 
regulations to support its future growth.12
According to a recent study by the Ministry of Entre-
preneurship and Digital Economy, 42 percent of Jor-
danian startups are based in the ICT sector.13 Among 
those startups or entrepreneurial projects are Liw-
wa, an online lender providing access to capital for 
SMEs in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
and Mawdoo3, a comprehensive online Arabic con-
tent publisher that provides premium quality Ara-
bic content. Other examples include HyperPay, Ara-
bia Weather, Jamalon, and CashBasha.14 The common 
factor among these pioneering projects is that they 
provide services utilizing ICT, which enables them 
to expand beyond the geography of Jordan, reaching 
customers in the MENA region and beyond. 
In addition, governmental, international, and local 
entities are leading efforts to enhance Jordan’s posi-
Chapter I: Socio-Economic Challenges and Reforms in Jordan
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tion as the regional digital hub by adopting a knowl-
edge-based economy model supported by ICT. For 
example, the telecom sector has been developed 
over the past few years, becoming one of the larg-
est telecommunications markets in the region. The 
highest revenue in the ICT sector comes from soft-
ware development activities, which reached USD 
82,516,683 in 2018, followed by software licenses 
sales, telecommunications equipment and telephone 
wholesales, and IT hardware and infrastructure in-
stallation respectively. All in all, software, internet 
and mobile apps, and games development together 
achieved a revenue of USD 189,335,496 in 2018 in do-
mestic and export markets, contributing to 23 per-
cent of total jobs in the sector. Therefore, these ar-
eas, which depend on creativity and intellectual 
property, have a greater potential to create jobs and 
revenues, if they are invested in and supported.15
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In 2018, 65 percent of the total revenue of the IT sec-
tor was domestic, equaling USD 487 million, while 
export revenues that relied on markets abroad was 
USD 262 million, constituting 35 percent of total rev-
enues.16 The main export markets for Jordan in IT 
services are Saudi Arabia (21.55 percent), the UAE 




19 “Employment and Unemployment,” Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2019 <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/labourforce/employment-and-
unemployment/> (accessed December 2, 2019).
20 “Ana V. Ibáñez Prieto, “Mercy Corps, iPARK launch social business incubator ‘Generation Impact’,” Jordan Times, December 9, 2018 <https://www.
jordantimes.com/news/local/mercy-corps-ipark-launch-social-business-incubator- percentE2 percent80 percent98generation-impact percentE2 percent80 
percent99> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
21 Jordan’s Startup Economy Survey Results.” 
22 Ibáñez Prieto, “Mercy Corps, iPARK launch social business incubator ‘Generation Impact’.”
23 Bilforon, 2019 <https://bilforon.com/> (accessed December 2, 2019).
(15.09 percent), Kuwait (12.62 percent), and the Neth-
erlands (7.64 percent). Other markets in the region 
include Iraq, Egypt, Qatar, and Palestine.17 However, 
export revenue growth has declined by 2.2 percent in 
the last year.18 Hence, there is a need to maintain re-
gional relations with these countries and to increase 
investments and incentives for more projects in this 
area.
On the other hand, in 2017, the number of people 
working in the ICT sector was 17,632, while the total 
number of employees in other economic sectors was 
1,040,527. Similarly, statistics from previous years fol-
low the same curve, which leaves the ICT sector con-
tributing to only 1-2 percent of total jobs in the coun-
try. In terms of newly created jobs, 813 out of 25,995 
new jobs were established in the ICT sector, which 
constitutes around three percent of total jobs creat-
ed in 2017.19 Hence, these numbers do not align with 
the targeted job creation needed in Jordan. 
Tech-enabled sharing economy startups 
One of the new and leading incubators in Jordan is 
Generations Impact, which targets youth unemploy-
ment as the core issue of its work. It hosts startups 
with a special focus on social impact and job cre-
ation. Launched by Mercy Corps and the technolo-
gy hub iPARK, the incubator hosts dynamic service 
startups that respond to direct needs of the local 
community and creates a (relatively) high number of 
jobs.20 One such hosted startup is Mrayti, a home de-
livery beauty service. It is the first specialized mo-
bile beauty salon in Jordan, and is based on the no-
tion that beauty should be accessible, affordable, and 
non-time consuming. Bookings are processed via 
mobile and web applications. The startup employs 
four full-time employees and over forty freelance 
stylists. All these employees are female, many of 
whom struggle to find other job opportunities and, 
in some cases, are the only provider for their fami-
lies.21 Bilforon is another similar startup, also host-
ed by Generations Impact. It is a specialized home-
made food delivery platform,22 and employs around 
200 home chefs in its business network.23
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These projects fall within the sharing economy 
framework and are based on a simple principle: en-
trepreneurs develop a marketplace application to 
connect service providers with customers in ex-
change for a commission on every order.24 Although 
these projects employ a relatively high number of 
people, they still need to address issues such as pub-
lic safety and hygiene, the two main obstacles to im-
plementing such projects. 
Scaling Projects and Expanding Beyond Jordan
While most startups in the current entrepreneur-
ial ecosystem are still in their early stages, the num-
ber of startups that could scale up and expand seems 
very small. Moreover, many of those startups that do 
scale-up relocate outside Jordan when reaching this 
stage. This affects the local ecosystem in terms of 
generated revenues, investments, and job creation. 
According to a survey conducted by Endeavor Jor-
dan, 72 percent of Jordanian entrepreneurs consider 
relocating their business out of the country. More-
over, 45 percent of those entrepreneurs have the 
possibility of relocating both their legal entity and 
their back office. The majority of survey respondents 
chose the UAE as an alternative country from which 
to operate their business, while a quarter of them 
chose the United States.25 As Jordan is a small mar-
ket, access to larger markets was the main driver for 
74 percent of those entrepreneurs who considered 
relocating, with 45 percent citing high taxation and 
40 percent referring to regulatory instability. In ad-
dition, financial access and advancements represent 
important attractions, while bureaucracy and cor-
ruption could be factors that contribute to destroy-
ing businesses in Jordan.26
24 Mohammad Albattikhi, “Sharing Economy Startups Are Not Tech Companies,” Medium, February 25, 2019 <https://medium.com/beyond-capital-blog/
sharing-economy-startups-are-not-tech-companies-74f8e5129018> (accessed December 2, 2019).
25 Rasha Manna, “Start up Jordan,” Venture, May 20, 2017 <http://www.venturemagazine.me/2017/05/start-up-jordan/> (accessed December 2, 2019).
26 Ibid. 
27 “The Top 20 Reasons Startups Fail,” CB Insights, November 6, 2019 <https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-failure-reasons-top/> (accessed 
December 11, 2019).
Figure 2: Driving factors to consider 
 relocating outside Jordan
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There is a lack of resources, data, and studies on 
entrepreneurship, especially quantitative and evi-
dence-based research. This makes it harder to plan 
and envision comprehensive and practical strate-
gies that lead to better measures and regulations. In 
addition, feasible business ideas could be more effi-
cient when built on scientific research and relevant 
databases. Because building those databases is not a 
task that individuals can do independently, there is a 
need to produce such databases on the national level 
to provide concrete data for entrepreneurs and offi-
cial decision-making bodies. 
According to many experts, the main challenge for 
startups to succeed is not finding funding sourc-
es, but rather the feasibility of the business idea it-
self. According to the tech market intelligence plat-
form CB Insights, 42 percent of startup failures relate 
to producing unfit products for targeted markets.27 
In this regard, entrepreneurship experts in Jordan 
repeatedly emphasize that the quality of startups’ 
concepts seems unsatisfying and not convincing to 
investors. Economic studies and national reports en-
courage citizens to invest and establish businesses in 
general sectors including education, agriculture, and 
services, which means the range of business ideas 
produced is broad and vague. 
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Recommendations
 - Introduce special laws and a unifying official legis-
lative council for entrepreneurship in Jordan  
Although the Ministry of Entrepreneurship has re-
cently been established to develop this business 
field, many other relevant stakeholders remain out 
of the loop with regard to planning and monitoring 
the entrepreneurial ecosystem, which lacks maturity 
in terms of institutional structuring and connectivi-
ty. Therefore, establishing a unifying official council 
to include all parties in the dialogue of improving en-
trepreneurship in Jordan is necessary to avoid frag-
mentation and duplication. This platform must pro-
vide a shared space and include different ministries, 
local business councils, agencies, the private sector, 
and non-governmental organizations. This legislative 
authority would enhance the process of implement-
ing laws and policy measures, especially in its inter-
sected and complex context. Regulating this sector 
requires clear definitions of entrepreneurship-relat-
ed terminology, distinguishing it from SMEs and oth-
er types of businesses, as a primary step to deter-
mine the challenges and opportunities in developing 
this sector.  
 - Change the approach to the ICT sector: tech-enabled 
sharing economy startups 
Although the ICT sector is one of the lowest job 
creators, it is still one of the main economic pillars 
boosting and stabilizing the local economy. Since 
software development creates the most jobs in ICT, 
Jordan’s private sector should encourage and main-
tain more projects in software, mobile apps, and 
games development. However, a new approach to 
ICT projects based on a tech-enabled sharing econ-
omy could use ICT efficiently and still achieve great-
er job creation. In order to establish more efficient 
and successful projects in this field, business ideas 
should be developed based on real local needs, us-
ing ICT in parallel. Therefore, the Ministry of Entre-
preneurship, in collaboration with the private sec-
tor, should take the lead in building and ensuring the 
required infrastructure for designing such projects. 
Besides, the Ministry should prepare a strategic plan 
to follow up on these projects continuously, to eval-
uate their progress, and better monitor emerging 
problems in the ecosystem. Moreover, incubators 
and accelerators should raise awareness among their 
entrepreneurs of the concept of sharing economy 
projects and their impact.  
 - Navigate for new markets and expande beyond 
 Jordan by means of ICT
As the Kingdom provides a small domestic market, 
which at the same time suffers from recession in 
most sectors, the search for new and non-tradition-
al markets of demand becomes a priority. Examin-
ing real demands and possible linkages in the supply 
chains of goods and services could be a key to creat-
ing more jobs within the current available resourc-
es. More promising opportunities could be found in 
service sectors such as tourism, homemade prod-
ucts, and hydroponic, organic, and specialist kinds of 
farming. 
More importantly, there is a dire need for targeting 
regional and global markets, in parallel to designing 
scalable and expandable business models, which is 
only possible by the strategic utilization of ICT. This 
kind of knowledge should be produced as fact sheets, 
newsletters, and indicative business plans on a regu-
lar (yearly, quarterly, and monthly) basis by different 
parties including the Ministry of Entrepreneurship 
and Digital Marketing as well as strategic business 
and investment research centers. Ultimately, a clear 
national vision for feasible business options should 
be produced and updated regularly, to provide clear 
insights and guidance for young entrepreneurs, so 
they have a solid basis on which to plan their busi-
nesses. This emphasizes the importance of provid-
ing connection channels between entrepreneurs and 
professional experts. 
 - Connect entrepreneurs with local contexts
Exchanging ideas between entrepreneurs and local 
councils or citizens, where real needs could be deliv-
ered and discussed constructively, is crucial. There-
fore, incubation programs - incubators and acceler-
ators - must adopt a more practical and contextual 
approach in their programs by providing mentor-
ing and consultation programs in an interdisciplin-
The main challenge for 
 startups to succeed is to find 
a feasable business idea
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ary and research-based approach, in addition to in-
cluding fieldwork and local networking instead of 
lecture-based training inside isolated rooms. On the 
other hand, the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and 
other official bodies, such as municipalities and lo-
cal development centers, should provide facilities for 
networking processes between entrepreneurs and 
local communities, and between customers and the 
business providers that enable such projects.
 - Rethink students’ graduation projects as startups
One promising opportunity for youth to generate 
competent ideas lies within the graduation projects 
of college students, which usually take place in the 
final year, and are completed in order to graduate. 
Many such projects could be transformed into start-
ups or business projects after graduation, especial-
ly when taking into consideration the time and ef-
fort invested in them. This opportunity could be 
enhanced by enabling an interdisciplinary learning 
environment that connects different students from 
different disciplines. Additionally, incubators and 
entrepreneurship support programs could be in-
volved to some extent, providing feedback in the ear-
ly stages when designing these projects to enhance 
the possibility of creating feasible and marketable 
projects. 
Furthermore, in the age of the fourth industrial rev-
olution, basic IT knowledge among college students 
across different disciplines is a necessity. As such, 
re-envisioning national curricula and education 
plans to enable interdisciplinary and project-based 
learning at different levels is vital in order to keep up 
with the latest technological developments. To this 
end, addressing the main concepts of IT and entre-
preneurship in school and university curricula would 
raise students’ awareness and help them develop 
technological and entrepreneurial skills at a young 
age. 
The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of High-
er Education, in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Entrepreneurship and Digital Economy, should open 
dialogue with a wide spectrum of experts and enti-
ties to create a national curriculum that takes the re-
quired knowledge and skills of future entrepreneurs 
into consideration. Besides, designing graduation 
projects in an incubation context, similar to the sup-
port startups receive from incubators, would be bet-
ter enhanced and developed on the national level by 
the same ministries.  
 - Increase research on entrepreneurship
There is a dire need to produce research and data-
bases to support the scientific development of en-
trepreneurship in Jordan and to help entrepreneurs 
to develop better ideas when designing their projects 
based on valid data. Moreover, mapping local service 
providers across the country is a necessary step for 
creating sharing economy businesses built on link-
ing service providers with customers, in addition to 
analytic research for markets and customers. There-
fore, private and public research centers should be 
oriented and supported by governmental authorities 
to conduct such research, with a special focus on job 
creation and business models. 
Hadeel Alqatamin is a researcher and communi-
cations officer with the West Asia-North Africa 
(WANA) Institute. She joined WANA through the 
Lazord Fellowship Programme, which provides 
young graduates with professional and civic skills 
through year-long job placements, mentoring, and 
training. Over the course of her Lazord fellowship, 
she has worked with the economic growth pillar 
in WANA on the research project “Syrian Refugee 
Return: Implications for the Jordanian Host State.” 
She holds an MA in Architecture from the Univer-
sity of Jordan, where she also worked as a teach-
ing assistant. 
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Women in Jordan enjoy some of the highest education 
rates in the region, consistently outnumbering men in 
universities and outscoring them at every grade and 
age level. However, Jordan finds itself in the peculiar 
predicament of simultaneously having the lowest la-
bor market participation rates for women in the re-
gion. The only countries that perform worse, Syria and 
Yemen, are going through prolonged periods of war 
and political strife.28 The latest Jordanian unemploy-
ment figures reached 26.9 percent in 2018 for wom-
en,29 although there is often a more resounding effect 
on the ground.30 Social norms remain a major barrier 
that hinders women’s access to the labor market and 
that need to be tackled. Also, by ensuring that work-
ing mothers have access to affordable childcare, in-
stitutionalizing mentorship programs, and reforming 
work-related legislation, the Jordanian government 
could secure economic progress from an increase in 
female employment.
Jordan’s economy has faced a steep decline since 
2008, and while the country has introduced con-
siderable measures to realign the economy, low fe-
male labor force participation is an obvious, ma-
jor weakness that must be addressed.31 In 2018, 15.4 
percent of women in the kingdom were economical-
ly active, with 11.3 percent being employed.32 How-
ever, in the same year, 56.4 percent of men in Jor-
dan were economically active, with 47.1 percent 
being employed.33Unemployed women reflect the 
high education rates of Jordan: very few are illiter-
ate, 5.3 percent have less than a secondary educa-
tion, 2.6 percent have a secondary education, and 
78.8 percent have a bachelor’s degree or above.34 A 
28 Marta Vidal, “The Jordanian Women Fighting for Labour Rights,” Equal Times, December 4, 2018 <www.equaltimes.org/the-jordanian-women-fighting-
for?lang=en#.XUfnX6eB3fZ> (accessed November 29, 2019). 
29 Department of Statistics, 2018 <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/> (accessed December 11, 2019).
30 “Jordan Employment Rate,” Trading Economics, August 2019 <www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/employment-rate> (accessed November 29, 2019).
31 Mihaylo Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation in Employment Through Vocational Education and Training in Jordan,” ETF, PRIME Issues 
Paper, 2016, pp. 7-8 <www.etf.europa.eu/sites/default/files/m/13B3612BD2694D28C125802000327DE9_PRIME percent20Issues percent20Paper 
percent20Jordan.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2019).
32 Ibid.
33 The term “economically active” is akin to the labor force participation rate, but less broad. It does not include students or those bound to the home, 
which obviously includes more women. Given the nuances of this definition, researchers are able to look further into why someone is not economically active. 
In Jordan, this is particularly revealing.
34 Department of Statistics <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/> (accessed December 11, 2019).
35 Lauren Burke, “Bridging Jordan’s Gender Gap,” Center for International Private Enterprise, March 27, 2018 <www.cipe.org/blog/2018/03/27/bridging-
jordans-gender-gap/> (accessed November 29, 2019). 
36 “The Economic Participation of Women in Jordan: Broken Promises, Unspoken Rules,” Jordan Labour Watch, Phoenix Center for Economic and 
Informatics Studies, March 7, 2017, p. 2 <www.labor-watch.net/uploads/en_labor-watch.net_636396202865859367.pdf> (accessed November 29, 2019).
37 Renad Aljadid, “Amman ranked most expensive Arab city, 28th worldwide,” The Jordan Times, May 29, 2018 <http://jordantimes.com/news/local/
amman-ranked-most-expensive-arab-city-28th-worldwide> (accessed December 11, 2019).
38 Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation,” p. 36.
39 Ibid, p. 3.
Brookings Institute study estimated that Jordan los-
es a full point of its GDP because of the unutilized la-
bor of women.35 When women are not able to find 
employment, it hampers families’ financial security, 
which in turn stymies economic growth. Jordan has 
one of the highest regional dependency rates, be-
cause less than a quarter of the population is able to 
support themselves on their own.36 For example, the 
capital city Amman is ranked as the most expensive 
Arab city and ranks 28th worldwide.37 In 2003, the 
World Bank estimated that if women were able to in-
crease their access to the labor market then house-
hold income could increase by about 25 percent. 
This would lower the dependency rate and raise the 
livelihood of many Jordanian families, while provid-
ing an opportunity for women to secure more eco-
nomic opportunities.38
An additional problem is that when women feel un-
safe in a workplace, or they are unable to find a job 
that is suitable, they flock to the informal econo-
my. Ironically, the informal sector is far more likely 
to have unsafe working conditions and also pays sig-
nificantly less. In many cases, women opt to stay at 
home. Those who do continue to work, often in agri-
culture, education, and small businesses, continue to 
suffer the same intolerable treatment as before, but 
often with longer hours, less stability, and potentially 
more harassment. Highlighting the potential dangers 
of the informal sector, a recent Security Corporation 
study found that insurance evasion could be as high 
as ninety percent.39
Barriers that Hinder Women’s Access to the Labor 
Market
There is no shortage of studies or groups seeking to 
rectify the gender gap in the economy. What has re-
sulted from these endeavors is a solid understanding 
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of why the economy has developed this way and why 
it continues to reject women from the workforce. 
The complexity of the problem can be broken down 
into several facets, such as lack of choice for wom-
en in the economy, the mismatch between education 
and labor market requirements, company discrimi-
nation, poor conditions, and the weak rule of law. 
“For women in particular, perceptions of their capac-
ities remain weak, for society and government poli-
cies continue to reinforce their dependency through 
a patriarchal system.”40 Despite the high education 
levels of the female population, there is a disconnect 
between constitutional rights for women and social 
norms, which invariably harms the population and 
Jordan’s economy as a whole.41
The social pressure women face plays a large role in 
women’s work, both directly and indirectly. Women 
remain concentrated in certain areas of the work-
force and nearly non-existent in others.42 Women 
are over-represented in the humanities, which some 
claim is not a “gender issue” but a question of supply 
and demand.43 However, there are indications that 
where women work reflects where society deter-
mines spaces deemed appropriate for them. These 
are jobs in teaching, health, and social services. 
Women most commonly work in areas that reflect 
their role as a caretaker.44 For women with less for-
40 Ibid., p.14.
41 “Gender Equality and Female Empowerment: Jordan,” U.S. Agency for International Development, February 14, 2019 <www.usaid.gov/jordan/gender-
equality-womens-empowerment> (accessed November 29, 2019).
42 Department of Statistics <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/> (accessed December 11, 2019).
43 Burke, “Bridging Jordan’s Gender Gap.”
44 Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation,” p. 33.
45 Department of Statistics <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/> (accessed December 11, 2019).
46 Ibid., p. 27-28.
47 Ibid., p..24.
48 Ibid., p. 30.
49 Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation,” p. 29.
mal education, the family determines whether they 
work or not to an increasingly larger extent.45
Moreover, there is the added burden of even being 
hired. Despite the sheer number of women who have 
an impressive education, studies have shown that 
companies do not want to hire Jordanian youth or 
women. It has been reported that these companies 
were disappointed in their employees, who have lit-
tle experience, knowledge of real-life application of 
their studies, or soft skills that help make a success-
ful company.46 There is an apparent gap between 
the education women and men receive and the de-
mands of the labor market. When university students 
are seen as not having the right skills, there should 
logically be other routes for students to gain practi-
cal knowledge. However, gaining valuable vocation-
al skills in Jordan is typically seen as being inferior to 
university and further schooling. In general, men and 
women are stigmatized by pursuing vocational train-
ing, and are seen as not smart enough and not com-
ing from an affluent family. Women are particular-
ly stigmatized and continue to suffer the same plight 
as women in university, in that they are relegated 
to only a few distinct types of work.47 An addition-
al study found that about thirty percent of business 
owners do not believe that women can accomplish a 
job as successfully as men. Negative perceptions of 
women deter companies from hiring women, since 
they do not have to deal with issues such as materni-
ty leave or providing childcare facilities.48
Women in work face additional pressure as they 
must balance their job with the role of the caregiver. 
When women face sharp criticism because they can-
not balance their lives, it incentivizes them to stay 
home and leave work to their husbands. Those who 
remain in work often succumb to the sheer exhaus-
tion of living two parallel lives, end their career early, 
and do not enter the labor market again.49
Despite women’s                  
high education levels, there 
is a disconnect between 
constitutional rights for 
women and social norms
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Issues in the Existing Legal Framework
The societal determination of where women should 
take up space is so ingrained that it often prevails 
against the rule of law. Multiple laws seek to pro-
tect women in the workforce and attempt to give 
them some sort of cushion, such as anti-bias laws in 
the workplace, or Article 72 of the Labor Law, which 
mandates companies who employ over twenty wom-
en to provide childcare.50 While a law was passed re-
cently to protect women from hiring bias, it remains 
a common practice. More often than not, companies 
will ignore the laws or avoid hiring women to fulfill 
the requirements.51 Labor laws in Jordan are still cre-
ated to reinforce a patriarchal viewpoint despite the 
push for equality reform. While the aforementioned 
equality laws have been seen as a win, they are also 
still a starting point. 
When Jordan ratified the International Labor Orga-
nization Equal Remuneration Convention, equal pay 
for equal work was supposed to become a reality. In-
stead, women are still paid about 41 percent less than 
their male coworkers. Multiple reports show that this 
does not cover childcare services that are vital to 
working women.52 This wage gap partly comes from 
the continual relegation of women to a few types of 
work, the lack of in-depth or professional training, 
and “the widespread belief that working women will 
eventually withdraw from the labor market, [which] 
severely hinders women’s ability to secure better in-
comes and a greater degree of independence.”53
Many laws perpetuate the dependency of wom-
en upon men and clear gaps in the law still exist.54 
Women are also more vulnerable to physical and ver-
bal harassment.55 Women have a very limited num-
ber of options when they endure harassment be-
cause there is no law against it. Often, they leave 
quietly in order to protect their own reputation and 
that of their family. Other times, they may report 
these instances of abuse, only for little or nothing to 
change.56 Recently, the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
50 Ibid., p. 30.
51 Burke, “Bridging Jordan’s Gender Gap.”
52 Ibid.
53 “The Economic Participation of Women,” p. 2.
54 Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation,” p. 31.
55 “The Economic Participation of Women,” p. 2.
56 Vidal, “The Jordanian Women Fighting for Labour Rights.”
57 Burke, “Bridging Jordan’s Gender Gap.”
58 Burke, “Bridging Jordan’s Gender Gap.”
59 Milovanovitch et al., “Increasing Female Participation,” p. 28.
60 Ibid, p. 28.
(CEDAW) Committee filed a report that showed most 
Jordanian women did not know how to file a com-
plaint against sexual harassment. Furthermore, those 
who did know were very hesitant to do so for fear of 
retaliation.57
Recommendations
Various organizations exist to promote women’s 
equality in the workplace, and who have published 
studies, made recommendations, and attempted to 
begin to fix this problem. However, there has been 
no multi-level, collaborative effort that encompasses 
the roots of the social order up to the top levels that 
perpetuate the current gender dynamic. While that 
is the ideal scenario, it can often take years or even 
decades to change the laws and culture of a country, 
but with small- and medium-sized efforts, a real dif-
ference can be made that will begin to turn the tide.58
 - Institutionalize female mentorship programs at 
universities
Every university should provide counseling services 
that specifically cater to women, so that they can 
know what they want and have the tools to achieve 
their desired goals.59 Universities should provide 
gender-sensitive counseling to teach women how to 
balance the roles of employee and caretaker, what 
career would suit them best, and even how to suc-
cessfully enter into a field.60
Mentorship programs 
should be institutionalized          
at  university level across           
the country
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Mentorship programs should be institutionalized at 
university level across the country, catering to fe-
male students in their third and final years. If the 
opportunity to expand practical knowledge can be 
given to women in the classroom without the add-
ed stress of finding a counselor, group, or workshop, 
this will reach a much broader audience.61
 - Implement a national campaign to provide afford-
able childcare for working mothers
In 2016, a study published by Sadaqa, a non-profit 
that aims to give women a supportive environment in 
the workplace, showed that companies who provided 
their female employees with child care could save up 
to USD 1 million. After campaigning to hundreds of 
companies with their research, ninety firms agreed 
to set up childcare services.62 While this is an incred-
ible first step, it can be taken even further. A coun-
try-wide campaign by the Jordanian government is 
necessary for companies and employers to see and 
understand that women are not undeserving of em-
ployment, equal pay, and better working conditions. 
If companies can be convinced that hiring and keep-
ing women is not a burden but an asset, they will do 
so.
 - Establish support networks for female workers
Female workers need access to support networks 
not only to feel empowered in their workplace, but 
also to feel confident in their rights as human beings. 
By institutionalizing gender equality through train-
ing and support, issues that surface can be identified 
and addressed. When women are supported, they 
succeed, and if this success can be ingrained into 
the workplace, it will become a self-fulfilling prophe-
cy. As it stands, more points of access for these net-
works is vital as long as workplace harassment is still 
common.63 These networks could be in the form of 
national or international coalitions between existing 
organizations that work on women’s economic em-
powerment. Through these coalitions and networks, 
services and support could reach a broader target 
audience of female beneficiaries.
61 Ibid.
62 Vidal, “The Jordanian Women Fighting for Labour Rights.”
63 “Gender Equality and Female Empowerment.”
64 “The Economic Participation of Women,” p. 3.
65 Ibid.
 - Strengthen the rule of law by liberating unions
In order to demand that those who break these laws 
be held accountable, unions must be liberalized to 
protect their workers and advocate for better work-
ing conditions in a democratic fashion. These laws, 
too, are already in place. However, they are not be-
ing properly enforced. An agency must be created so 
that workers who call upon the law to do its job can 
be protected.64 This could be in the form of a pro-
fessional union or syndicate that caters to female 
employees across the country. Women’s burgeon-
ing role in politics is no small factor. To win sup-
port for women, their opportunities in new sectors 
across the economy, and their comfort and safety, 
having women lead this movement is a necessity, and 
this must be inextricably tied to the advancement 
of the country. Women’s success should become 
acutely associated with the advancement of import-
ant economic projects in Jordan such as agriculture 
and industrial and commercial developments. Wom-
en’s active participation acts as an indicator for the 
economy as a whole, since a positive correlation ex-
ists between the condition of women and econom-
ic activity.65
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THE IMPACT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES’ 
RETURN TO SYRIA ON EMPLOYMENT 
PROGRAMS IN JORDAN 
Reine El Wer
Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, Syrian ref-
ugees have moved to Jordan and started seeking job 
opportunities in their host community, entering the 
Jordanian labor market in large numbers. Multi-
ple programs by international donors in cooperation 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provid-
ed support and jobs to the Jordanian host communi-
ty as well as the Syrian refugees. As Syrian refugees 
have started to return to their home country, the funds 
for such projects are decreasing, even though the num-
ber of returns – 34,000 so far - is very low compared 
to the total number of Syrian refugees officially resid-
ing in Jordan. The main donors and implementers of 
such programs, as well as the relevant governmental 
entities, are urged to maintain and not decrease the 
level of funding. In addition, donors and implementers 
working in the field who have deep insight into what is 
needed on the ground should work together to design 
programs that have a longer-term approach and hence 
a more sustainable impact.
Unemployment in Jordan reached 19 percent during 
the first quarter of 2019, constituting a 0.6 percent 
increase compared to the same period in 2018, ac-
cording to a report released by the Department of 
Statistics (DoS).66 A recent International Labour Or-
ganization report states that “there are already re-
ports of significant impacts from the influx of Syrian 
refugees on the Jordanian labour market, and there 
are strong concerns about the effects on available job 
opportunities, wage levels, working conditions, ac-
cess to work, etc., for Jordanians as well as for the 
refugees and immigrant workers.”67 In response, nu-
merous programs have been designed, funded, and 
implemented by international donors, and national 
and international NGOs, in order to help both Syr-
ian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians find job op-
portunities, provide training, and integrate them 
into the labor market to improve their living condi-
tions. However, evidence suggests “that the context 
is changing. Donor funding is predicted to decrease 
66 “Unemployment continues to rise in 2019, hitting 19%,” The Jordan Times, June 4, 2019 <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/unemployment-
continues-rise-2019-hitting-19> (accessed December 10, 2019).
67 Svein Erik Stave and Solveig Hillesund, “Impact of Syrian refugees on the Jordanian labour market,” International Labour Organization Regional Office 
for the Arab States and Fafo, 2015 <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_364162.pdf> 
(accessed December 10, 2019).
68 Ibid.
69 “The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan: Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps,” Reliefweb, 
February 10, 2019 <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/living-conditions-syrian-refugees-jordan-results-2017-2018-survey-syrian-refugees> (accessed 
December 10, 2019). 
and attention within the government is shifting away 
from emergency refugee response.”68
The Impact of Decreasing Funds 
The programs targeting Syrian refugees and Jordani-
ans focus on a Cash for Training/Work approach and 
are implemented in cities and governorates across 
Jordan, as Syrian refugees are spread throughout the 
Kingdom. The selected beneficiaries are enrolled in the 
programs according to set categories such as age, av-
erage income, and family size. They are provided with 
basic training in vocational professions and enrolled 
in workplaces to gain experience during the project. 
The programs aim to empower participants with the 
skills needed to enter and stay in the labor market, and 
eventually improve their income and living conditions.
Such programs reach thousands of Jordanians and 
Syrians every year. Participants gain new skills and 
work via short-term opportunities, which allow them 
to provide for their families for the duration of the 
project. Furthermore, these programs demand a 50:50 
participation of both men and women, providing equal 
opportunities to women in gaining skills, entering the 
labor market, and generating income, none of which 
would normally be possible. Reports show that 22 
percent of all Syrian refugee households in Jordan are 
headed by women.69 The number of Jordanian wom-
en heading their households is increasing noticeably. 
NGOs, which implement such programs, have devel-
oped a good working relationship with people across 
the country. Vulnerable people are now waiting for 
opportunities to register and benefit from the pro-
grams provided. Despite the number of existing pro-
grams, they still only cover a fraction of those in 
need. Yet, as Syrian refugees in Jordan have recent-
ly started to return to their home country, funds for 
such programs have decreased, including multiple 
projects funded by European donors, which aim to 
help refugees and the host community at the same 
time. However, the number of registered returns – 
estimated at 34,000 – is only a small fraction of the 
total number of registered Syrian refugees in Jor-
dan and a large number of Syrian refugees are ex-
pected to remain in the country. Therefore, the cut 
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in funds for programs targeting vulnerable popula-
tions of both Jordanians and Syrian refugees has had 
a significant impact on the livelihood of people who 
depend on such programs to enter the labor market 
and provide for their families.70
The Focus of Current Programs Lacks Long-Term 
Impact 
Overall, the programs funded and implemented by 
national and international NGOs follow more or less 
the same approach, which can be summarized as ei-
ther unconditional aid, Cash/Food for Training, or 
Cash/Food for Work. Unconditional aid means the 
NGOs provide aid, including food assistance, to Syr-
ians exclusively with no conditions or specific eli-
gibility criteria. Cash/Food for Training and Cash/
Food for Work programs target both Syrians and Jor-
danians with a 50:50 gender ratio.
Cash/Food for Training programs mainly focus on pro-
viding short-term opportunities where the beneficia-
ries are trained in particular skills and placed with em-
ployers only for the duration of the project. However, 
many beneficiaries request either programs that last 
longer, or an approach that foresees longer-term em-
ployment. This is an indication that better-tailored ap-
proaches are needed. Yet, only few programs focus 
on long-term job placements via “On the Job Train-
ing.” In this case, b e n e f i c i a r i e s  are provided with 
vocational training based on a pre-project assessment 
and subsequently placed in work related to the train-
ing. After the end of the “On the Job Training,” the contin-
uation of their employment depends on how skillful and 
committed they are.
Recommendations
 - Ensure sufficient funding for programs by address-
ing decision-makers and cooperating with 
stakeholders to highlight the benefits 
The highlights and benefits of such programs must 
be widely shared and promoted to reach deci-
sion-makers and obtain the necessary support. Ex-
isting reports, research, and analyses by the donors 
and project implementers can be used to highlight 
the programs’ benefits and convince decision-mak-
ers to bring funding back to previous levels. Deci-
sion-makers to be approached include: donors such 
as the World Food Programme and governmental 
entities and ministries, such as the Ministry of La-
70 “Jordan, General Food Assistance to Syrian Refugees: an evaluation,” World Food Programme, January 8, 2019 <https://www.wfp.org/publications/
jordan-general-food-assistance-syrian-refugees-evaluation> (accessed December 10, 2019).
bor, the Ministry of Planning and International Co-
operation, and the Vocational Training Corporation. 
Organizations that have access to these key actors 
include, in particular, program implementers – na-
tional and international NGOs – which play an im-
portant role in this regard.
 - Revamping the current approaches of funded pro-
grams to focus on a longer-term perspective and 
impact
A new approach and concept to designing the pro-
grams that target Syrians and the Jordanian host 
community should be developed, one that focuses on 
creating longer-term perspectives and impact. For 
this purpose, a “graduation” concept could be used, 
where program beneficiaries can transition from 
short-term programs to sustainable job opportuni-
ties. The “graduation” approach is similar to the col-
lege graduation concept, in which beneficiaries/stu-
dents spend a certain amount of time learning both 
theoretical knowledge and practical skills, which 
they can then use after “graduation” to find sustain-
able employment in order to secure a stable income 
and support themselves and their families.
Such a “graduation” program would start with train-
ing by professional training institutions and placing 
participants in jobs based on a market assessment 
of the professions needed. The program should in-
clude mechanisms to follow-up on their progress 
and commitment. In addition, it should also focus 
on developing soft skills that beneficiaries will need 
to find and keep long-term employment. This could, 
for example, be conducted jointly by different NGOs. 
Such a program could also support individuals with 
their own business ideas to develop their business 
plan and secure funding. Organizations can devel-
op specific “graduation” plans based on existing pro-
grams and databases of beneficiaries from previous 
programs. Success stories can be shared, and gradu-
ate beneficiaries can pass on their own success sto-
ries to new program participants.
Reine El Wer is a business development advisor at 
the National Alliance Against Hunger and Mal-
nutrition (NAJMAH). Her responsibilities include 
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preparing reports during and after projects. Her 
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TRIBAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN 
JORDAN – A PATHWAY TOWARDS 
LEGAL POLICY IN A HYBRID 
SETTING
Sarah Jakob
Tribal conflict resolution has a long history in Jordan. 
The state system is intertwined with the tribal system 
and together they form a hybrid legal order following 
unofficial rules. Yet, after the major influx of Pales-
tinians, Syrians, Iraqis, and others, the population has 
become more diverse than it was at the formation of 
the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921. These population 
groups do not carry the same tribal history but have 
become citizens and inhabitants of the state of Jordan. 
In general, the urban population has become more de-
tached from the tribal heritage. Today, the Jordanian 
state seeks to strengthen its institutions and foster a 
national Jordanian identity. At the same time, the trib-
al traditions constitute identity for a significant part 
of the population and cannot be suppressed without 
major repercussions. A balanced legal policy could en-
hance trust in the legal system but only if it is carried 
out on the basis of a proper analysis of possible mea-
sures, the benefits and drawbacks of each system, and 
the perception of the population. Hence, a sustainable 
legal policy should be based on qualitative and quanti-
tative data, balancing the positive aspects of tribal jus-
tice with enhanced legal authority of the state, as well 
as the expectations of citizens.
The Binary Legal System, Sulha and its Functions
Tribal conflict resolution, sulha (lit. reconciliation), 
was the dominant way of resolving disputes before 
the founding of the state of Jordan. With the creation 
of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, a binary sys-
tem of official state law and tribal custom emerged. 
Although tribal law was officially abolished in 1976, 
tribal custom continues to play a consequential role 
in the Jordanian judicial system. In criminal law cas-
es, it is a central factor in the mitigation of punish-
ment or the payment of compensation, and also de-
termines whether a pardon by the King can take 
effect. A legal dispute can be dropped entirely if trib-
al reconciliation has taken place. This is, however, 
only possible if the case is not lead by the prosecu-
tion, then the right for the state to prosecute will re-
main. Furthermore, judges delay judgments if a tribal 
1 This analysis is based on the academic work preceding this paper: Sarah Jakob, “Tribal Conflict Resolution in Jordan and its Relation to State Law and 
Governance. A Constitutionalist Perspective,” Master’s Thesis, Utrecht University, 2019. Qualitative interviews with stakeholders in the tribal sphere and the 
state apparatus as well as with judges and scholars served to describe the functions of tribal law as well as its relationship to state law and governance.
2 Danielle Sutton, “Tribal Law at the Crossroads of Modernity: A Study on Jordanian Attitudes towards Jalwa,” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection, 
no. 2827, Spring 2018, p. 35 <https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3848&context=isp_collection> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
agreement has not been reached in parallel, as on-
ly the tribal agreement assures that societal peace is 
achieved and that the risk of revenge no longer per-
sists. This process is semi-official: the courts take 
the sulha documents into consideration and judg-
es are in contact with governors who inform them 
about the progress of the tribal procedure.1
Sulha has been a major pillar of stability and securi-
ty for Jordan as it enhances social cohesion in (trib-
al) society and prevents an interpersonal conflict 
from becoming a feud between tribes, which would 
be a security risk and difficult to handle with the 
tools of state law. Yet, some measures of tribal con-
flict resolution are in conflict with values set forth 
in the constitution. For example, one tribal method 
for preventing revenge is jelwa, which constitutes 
the relocation of entire families. Jelwa entails dis-
ruption to the lives of citizens and can have severe 
socio-economic consequences. Family members of 
the perpetrator are punished for a deed they did not 
commit. The government has attempted to limit jel-
wa from five generations to the core family. Yet, the 
aim of preventing violence determines state officials’ 
decisions on who has to leave and for how long. The 
necessity to relocate, which depends on the specif-
ic situation, is thus a decisive factor. Preliminary re-
search shows that those who grew up in rural areas 
still perceive jelwa as a positive and necessary tribal 
measure worth maintaining. Within the urban pop-
ulation this is less so.2 Age does not seem to deter-
mine the perception of jelwa and, hence, the pre-
sumption that it will naturally lose significance over 
time is not necessarily correct. From the case of jel-
wa, it can be assumed that this is also true for tribal 
conflict resolution in general.
Hence, for the state, jelwa (and tribal justice in gen-
eral) has positive and practical as well as problematic 
aspects. The rural-urban divide shows that the regu-
lation or codification of these flexible and adaptable 
customs is an intricate issue. State measures regu-
lating tribal custom have to be accepted by society, 
otherwise they will not succeed. At the same time, 
feelings of inequality do not contribute to fostering 
a national identity. Any reform thus necessitates the 
balancing of (short and long-term) feasibility as well 
as practical and cultural aspects.
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Interest Groups, Demographic Change, and the 
Authority of Tribes
When determining a policy on tribal custom and 
its interaction with the state justice system, Jordan 
needs to balance several interest groups. This bal-
ancing act also concerns the stability of the state 
system and should be carried out according to the 
demands of a changing society. The tribal system 
and its methods of conflict resolution are close-
ly connected to agreements between the Hashemite 
monarchy and the tribes at the point of state forma-
tion. Tribal justice and its values have provided sta-
bility and identity for the young Jordanian state, but 
the demographic composition of the Jordanian soci-
ety has changed and the demand for stronger insti-
tutions has risen. In the light of these developments, 
the question arises of how the population and its dif-
ferent demographic groups perceive the status quo, 
and if the legal status quo needs to be revised.
In general, tribal justice has advantages and disad-
vantages for the Jordanian state. On the one hand, 
tribal justice enhances the effectiveness of the justice 
system as it shortens legal procedures and lessens 
the pressure on the state justice system and its ca-
pacities. It also leads to a permanent resolution of 
conflict, whereas the state system is often perceived 
as being unable to reestablish social peace because it 
only punishes the individual and does not take into 
account social and cultural values. Especially in cas-
es of physical violence, when emotions and the risk 
of revenge are high, tribal justice is effective in ap-
peasing the conflict as well as negotiating diya, com-
pensation, and ensuring its payment to the victim 
or his/her family. It is a justice system that emerged 
out of the tribal arrangement of society, whereas the 
state system is largely designed according to Euro-
pean role models. By integrating the tribal system in 
legal procedures and securing support from the trib-
al sphere for the state, it becomes a tool of gover-
nance, supports the functioning of institutions, and 
lends legitimacy to the Jordanian state.
On the other hand, as the society is no longer pre-
dominantly tribal and as the solidification of Jorda-
nian statehood demands strong institutions and a 
common national identity, tribal practices also un-
dermine the state. In some specific fields, neither 
legislation nor the enforcement of law are entirely in 
the hands of the state, but both involve a process of 
3 Jakob, “Tribal Conflict Resolution in Jordan,” p. 36.
4 Ibid., p. 33.
5 Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Herrschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), p. 217.
negotiation between tribal figures and state institu-
tions. The power of tribal figures becomes very vis-
ible in conflict resolution, when their authority has 
more weight in preventing violence than those of 
state forces.3 Tribal justice also perpetuates a trib-
al and patriarchal social order as it functions only 
with the premise of absolute respect towards trib-
al authorities. The crime of taqtia al wuja illustrates 
this: if an act of violence occurs despite the protec-
tion of a tribal Sheikh (kafil al dafa), whose authori-
ty and protection of the perpetrator’s family are sup-
posed to end violence and revenge, this crime will 
be treated as especially serious and lead to anoth-
er tribal procedure between the kafil and the individ-
ual who disrespected the tribal authority. This pro-
cedure has similarities to crimes against the state 
which are regarded as especially serious crimes.4 The 
tribal system assumes powers that are otherwise re-
served for the state. When employing Max Weber’s 
authority types, Jordan thus exists in a state be-
tween legal-rational authority (of the law and the of-
ficial government and judicial bodies) and the tradi-
tional authority of the tribal Sheikhs.5 Both obtain a 
certain legitimacy in their respective fields but not 
in the entirety of conflict resolution and the attribu-
tion of justice.
Tribal conflict resolution also strengthens the so-
cial entity of tribes. This might hinder the objective 
of fostering a common national identity and civil so-
ciety, and is likely to influence the ability of the state 
to function according to the general public need, in-
dependent from tribal demands. Hence, it could have 
the negative effect of enhancing a feeling of inequal-
ity between population groups (mainly Transjorda-
nians and Jordanian-Palestinians). Lastly, as in the 
case of jelwa, tribal measures can also stand in con-
flict with the rights and freedoms of Jordanian citi-
zens, and can prevent them from seeking justice via 
the state system.
The demand for  stronger 
 institutions in Jordan              
has  risen
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The Inefficiency of Suppression and Codification
In the past, the government has experimented with 
several measures to gain more control over trib-
al custom. These past experiences show that sup-
pressing tribal conflict resolution is not a promis-
ing strategy. The abolition of tribal law in 1976 simply 
made the tribal system unofficial. Further attempts 
to suppress tribal custom would estrange tribes from 
the government, and tribal regions would feel (even 
more) marginalized and abandoned by the state. 
Abruptly removing this pillar of stability would al-
so be counter-productive as the tribal system saves 
state resources. Additionally, the concept of recon-
ciliation, agreement between the parties and social 
interaction during the sulha procedure, is almost 
universally considered a positive aspect of tribal jus-
tice and should therefore be maintained.
Codification is another obvious strategy at hand that 
could enhance state control, but since authority and 
legitimacy continue to lie with tribal figures, codi-
fication is an intricate issue as the state is de facto 
not the sole legislator and law enforcement power. 
While codification might formalize the customs, this 
formalization is of little value if it is not implement-
ed in specific cases. If the codification and limitation 
of custom are not accepted by the tribal community, 
the original customs will continue to yield their un-
official, flexible existence alongside state law. State 
law will then be violated, which causes legal insecu-
rity and allows the state to appear even more vulner-
able to tribal pressures. Furthermore, another posi-
tive aspect of tribal custom is that it is adaptable to 
the specific situation, enabling solutions that would 
not be possible with the tools of state law. Codifi-
cation of these measures might diminish this func-
tion. Yet again, this flexibility, taken together with 
6 Naomi Johnstone, “Tribal Dispute Resolution and Women’s Access to Justice in Jordan,” WANA Institute, June 22, 2015, p. 23 <http://wanainstitute.
org/en/publication/tribal-dispute-resolution-and-women%E2%80%99s-access-justice-jordan> (accessed December 11, 2019).
7 Jakob, “Tribal Conflict Resolution in Jordan,” pp. 65-6.
the partisanship associated with tribal conflict reso-
lution, can lead to the emergence of a belief that the 
rules are not the same for every citizen. Codification, 
taking the tribal custom under the wings of the state, 
could lessen this risk - or it could also institutional-
ize the unequal application of rules.
Lastly, no matter whether tribal traditions are codi-
fied or not, being familiar with certain rules and pro-
cedures makes a major difference for these rules be-
ing used and accepted. In particular, in more rural 
populations, a lack of knowledge of the state sys-
tem and how it functions is another impediment to 
its use,6 as people stick to the method they know and 
trust, especially in cases of conflict.
The Perception of the Status Quo
A central question for a balanced legal policy is thus 
linked to the developments in Jordanian society: how 
does the population at large perceive tribal justice? 
Do non-tribal parts of the population use the tribal 
system, and if so, why and under which circumstanc-
es? According to preliminary research,7 the answer 
depends on the segment of society the individuals 
come from, as well as the region (urban or rural), and 
on which side of the conflict they stand (that of the 
victim or the perpetrator). People whose identity is 
linked to a tribal background often appreciate the 
tribal justice system. This might not be the same for 
population groups without strong tribal affiliations 
and thus needs to be examined before determin-
ing a policy. Jordanian society has become more di-
verse and population groups such as Jordanian-Pal-
estinians, Syrians, Egyptians, and Iraqis might have 
a different perception of tribal justice and its usage 
as compared to Transjordanians. Palestinian-Jor-
danians, for example, might perceive that individu-
als belonging to Transjordanian tribes have more so-
cial power than non-tribal parts of the population, 
and thus use tribal conflict resolution to their advan-
tage. But the tribes are no longer monolithic blocks, 
and the younger urban generation in particular is be-
coming culturally more individualized and detached 
from tribal measures of conflict resolution.
Furthermore, the lack of trust in state institutions 
is one of the main problems that Jordan faces today. 
As the state is tolerating and, in some cases, actively 
sponsoring tribal justice, this can add to the impres-
sion that tribal justice and the binary system itself 
Jordanian society has become 
more diverse and  population 
groups have a different 
 perception of tribal justice
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lead to unfair procedures, social pressures, and in-
equalities within society.
Recommendations
The central challenge in Jordan is to design a le-
gal policy that enhances trust in public institutions 
and strengthens these institutions without los-
ing the support of the tribal parts of the population, 
and without ignoring tribal values and reconcilia-
tion. One straightforward take-away is that in order 
to achieve this, the capacities of state law and the 
state justice system should be enhanced. The prac-
tical need for tribal conflict resolution will diminish 
once procedures become more efficient and also af-
fordable to the average citizen, for example, by pro-
viding legal aid in case of need. Yet, the benefits of 
tribal justice need to be maintained and the percep-
tions and aspirations of the society and its different 
groups need to be taken into account. 
 - Gain knowledge and integrate the population in 
policy formation: opinion polling
In order to formulate precise policy recommenda-
tions, the government needs to gain more insight in-
to the perception of legal professionals as well as of 
the population at large. Because of the social dynam-
ics between tribal and non-tribal parts of the popu-
lation, it is especially important to inquire about the 
perception of population groups who are less con-
nected to Transjordanian tribal heritage. Having 
gathered these data, it is then possible to investigate 
whether there is a schism between the perception 
of the tribal sphere and that of the broader public. 
Based on this, follow-up measures can be designed 
in order to bridge a value and legal divide between 
groups, and to bring the public on board while devel-
oping a sustainable legal policy.
Therefore, before forming and implementing a strat-
egy on the state-tribal law relationship, the govern-
ment should commission an opinion polling firm to 
gather the necessary data necessary, such as NA-
MA Strategic Intelligence Solutions. Financial assis-
tance can be obtained through organizations such 
as the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Konrad-Ad-
enauer-Stiftung. The survey needs to be detailed in 
order to accurately capture the complexity of the 
issue. Questions should encompass the individu-
al’s tribal affiliations, if any (Transjordanian or oth-
erwise), and how s/he perceives the tribal process. 
This also entails asking about perceptions of a pow-
er difference between Transjordanian and non-Tran-
sjordanian parties, and why the tribal system is pre-
ferred (familiarity with the system, social pressure, 
financial reasons, and so on). The survey should be 
representative of the Jordanian governorates, taking 
into account urban as well as rural contexts and dif-
ferent age groups.
A smaller segment of society active in the legal 
field should also be asked to participate in a sepa-
rate survey. Participants should have a profession-
al legal background, the sample should contain judg-
es of lower instance courts as well as higher courts 
in the different governorates, and their social be-
longing (Transjordanian, Palestinian-Jordanian etc.) 
should be taken into consideration. Questions should 
inquire about their perception of the interaction of 
state law with tribal custom, and their suggestions 
and preferences for policy changes (no change, cod-
ification or non-legal measures, and so on). Addi-
tionally, it should be ascertained how well-known 
the tribal measures are within the legal profession. 
This survey will help to determine what works in le-
gal practice.
The reality in the legal field and its perception by 
the average citizen can be analyzed with these da-
ta. This would elucidate the perception and rele-
vance of tribal conflict resolution, and would indicate 
whether awareness of the intertwinement of systems 
needs to be raised, at the same time as showing re-
spect and interest in tradition as well as the percep-
tion of the individual citizen. This makes the accep-
tance of subsequent measures more likely, and also 
helps find a balanced long-term strategy, one that is 
not perceived as an affront by tribal society, and en-
hances the trust of the urban and non-tribal popula-
tion in institutions, as well as the feeling of belonging 
to the state. Such a legal policy should be designed 
as a pathway, not as a single measure, which inte-
grates the benefits of tribal justice measures as well 
as the expectations of the public.
 - Inform the public and raise awareness
Non-legal measures need to accompany any le-
gal policy changes. The law has little hope of being 
accepted if significant parts of the population per-
ceive it as foreign or cold, and prefer conflict resolu-
tion according to well-known tribal traditions. These 
non-legal measures, such as awareness-raising cam-
paigns, should be tailored to specific regions and 
populations groups, according to the data gathered 
via opinion polling. Such awareness-raising cam-
paigns might lessen the cold feelings towards state 
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law. Campaigns should inform people about state law 
without being one-sided, mentioning both the draw-
backs and advantages of both systems. In this way, 
knowledge of the state system is improved while 
impeding the suspicion that the state does not val-
ue traditions, or seeks to abolish them from one day 
to the next. The role of women in Bedouin society 
should be considered as well. Since mothers have 
significant influence within the household and es-
pecially on the behavior of their sons, their state of 
mind also determines the future of conflict resolu-
tion in Jordan. Furthermore, these campaigns should 
be designed in close collaboration with tribal figures. 
If they stand behind this measure, the chances are 
higher that the aim will be attained: greater aware-
ness of the legal system, the promotion of state law, 
and the enhancement of trust in state institutions.
On the other side of the spectrum, non-tribal citi-
zens who have not come into contact with the law 
(state law or tribal) are often not aware of the princi-
ples and procedures of either system. Yet, they might 
be especially weary of the tribal system and its influ-
ence on state law. By raising awareness of the princi-
ples and procedures of both the tribal and the state 
system, and how they currently interact, some prej-
udice might be mitigated and a more balanced view 
on the Jordanian justice system and its institutions 
might gain ground.
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Ludwig-Maximilians University Munich and Jean 
Moulin University Lyon III. 
Chapter II: Legislative Reform
27No. 6 | Januar 2020
REPORT
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
UNDER THE INTERPRETATION OF 
JORDANIAN LAW
Eman M. Alqaisi
Loose and vague phrases of the law and the dominant, 
repressive interpretation of Jordanian legal texts pose 
major threats to freedom of expression. In Jordan, many 
laws constrain freedom of expression, notably the penal 
code of 1960, the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006, the Cy-
bercrime Law, and the Press and Publications Law. On 
many occasions, these laws have been misused to im-
pose unjustified restrictions on the freedom of expres-
sion, prosecuting activists and journalists before the 
State Security Court and treating them as criminals. 
On the part of the authorities, these restrictions are 
justified on the grounds of protecting national securi-
ty, fighting terrorism, and protecting Jordan’s relations 
with other states. Therefore, the current legal interpre-
tations represent a flagrant violation of the fundamen-
tal right of Jordanians to freedom of expression. Jordan 
should comprehensively review the above-named laws 
and revise the proposed amendments, in order to com-
ply with the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution 
and international standards. The best way to do so is to 
initiate a national dialogue between governments, civ-
il society, stakeholders, and human rights advocates to 
find a better way to improve and protect the status of 
freedom of expression in Jordan. 
Jordanian National Security and the Right to Free-
dom of Expression
Jordan continues to be a target for terrorist groups, 
including the so-called Islamic State (IS) and al-
Qa’ida, for several reasons, including its proximity 
to regional conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the state’s of-
ficial rejection of Salafi-Jihadi interpretations of Is-
lam, and its membership of the anti-IS Coalition. Ma-
ny terrorist attacks have predominantly targeted the 
country’s security institutions, such as the Gener-
al Intelligence Directorate (GID) and Public Securi-
ty Directorate (PSD).8 Therefore, Jordan’s physical lo-
cation and political stance require it to harness its 
resources, efforts, and capabilities in order to meet 
the challenge of protecting its national security by 
all available means. In Jordan, as any country in the 
world, national security is a vital necessity.  Hence, 
specific reasons can exist, including the protection 
8 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Jordan,” US Department of State, UNHCR, July 19, 2017 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e43511.html> 
(accessed December 2, 2019).
9 “Jordan’s Constitution of 1952 with Amendments through 2011,” Constitute Project, August 12, 2019 <https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/
Jordan_2011.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019). 
of national security, that provide justifiable grounds 
to restrict the right to freedom of expression. How-
ever, national security should not be a catch-all ex-
cuse to threaten and restrict freedom of expression. 
National security and freedom of expression are 
strongly related to each other, because in an unsafe 
environment, people will not be able to exercise their 
right to freedom of expression; however, to protect 
one of the two does not necessarily require the cur-
tailing or reduction of the other. 
After the 2005 terrorist attacks on a hotel in Amman, 
Jordan adopted additional counter-terrorism mea-
sures, including new anti-terrorism laws and poli-
cies. But the concept of national security has been 
misused to impose unjustified restrictions on the 
freedom of expression. Such an abuse is facilitated 
by the difficult relationship and tension between na-
tional security and human rights protection. Thus, 
any restriction justified on national security grounds 
is not legitimate unless its true purpose and de-
monstrable effect is to protect a country’s existence 
against any threat, whether from an external or in-
ternal source.
Freedom of Expression and Jordanian Legislation
The Jordanian constitution of 1952 accords great im-
portance to freedom of expression. Article 15 states: 
“The state shall guarantee freedom of opinion and 
every Jordanian shall be free to express his opinion 
by speech, in writing, or using photographic repre-
sentation and other forms of expression, providing 
that such does not violate the law. Freedom of the 
press, publications, and mass media shall be ensured 
within the limits of the law.”9 Besides, Article 15 in-
dicates that freedom of expression is guaranteed by 
law without limitations, except those outlined in Jor-
dan’s national laws. Moreover, Article 7(2) states “ev-
ery infringement on rights and public freedoms or 
the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is 
a crime punishable by law.” Importantly, Article 128 
concludes that “laws issued by this Constitution to 
regulate the rights and freedoms shall not impair the 
substance of these rights or affect their fundamen-
tals.” The constitution protects the right to freedom 
of expression and directly refuses to sacrifice it, no 
matter what the reasons are.
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However, freedom of expression is not absolute; it 
could be legitimately restricted by law in certain cir-
cumstances. According to Article 19 of the UN In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(CCPR), public authorities may restrict this right 
if they can show that their action is lawful, neces-
sary, and proportionate in order to ensure the re-
spect of the rights or reputations of others, the pro-
tection of national security or of public order, public 
health, or morals.10 Therefore, restrictions on the en-
joyment of freedom of expression should be legiti-
mate and compatible with the provisions, aims, and 
objectives of the covenant of the CCPR and should 
not be discriminatory. 
Yet, even though Jordan’s restrictions on freedom 
of expression are indeed codified in law and most 
of them could arguably fit within the scope of the 
abovementioned “legitimate restrictions,” the laws 
are not clearly defined. The vagueness of the laws’ 
terminology does not serve the aims of “legitimate 
restrictions,” and they both restrict and criminalize 
the right to freedom of expression in the name of 
protecting the higher interests of society, state secu-
rity, and fighting terrorism.
The Penal Code of 1960
The Jordanian Penal Code of 1960 includes numer-
ous vague and broad texts that pose serious threats 
to freedom of expression. Under the pretext of un-
dermining state security, articles 110 to 153 of the Pe-
nal Code criminalize any act, speech, or writing that 
would harm the security of the Kingdom, threat-
en the social, political and economic system of Jor-
dan and undermine the Jordanian political regime 
or incite opposition against it. Moreover, Article 118 
punishes anyone who engages in “acts, writings, 
or speeches not approved by the government that 
would subject Jordan to the danger of violent acts 
or disturbs its relations with a foreign state,” with a 
minimum of five years’ imprisonment.11
The problem here lies in the broadness of articles 
110 to 153 of the Penal Code, which do not require 
any act of hostility or protest by a foreign state in 
10 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations, adopted December 16, 1966 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/
Pages/CCPR.aspx> (accessed December 2, 2019).
11 “JORDAN ILA Country Report,” Internet Legislation Atlas, 2015 <https://internetlegislationatlas.org/data/summaries/jordan.pdf< (accessed December 
11, 2019).
12 Hazem Suleiman Toubat et al., “Limitations on Freedom of Expression for the Protection of National Security: A Case Study of Jordan,” Imperial Journal 
of Interdisciplinary Research (3)11, 2017, pp. 240-1.
13 Sara Obeidat, “Jordan’s Anti-Terrorism Law: another Step against Reform,” 7iber, June 25, 2014 <http://7iber.com/2014/06/jordans-anti-terrorism-
law-another-step-against-reform/> (accessed December 2, 2019.
14 “Jordan: Terrorism Amendments Threaten Rights, Greatly Expand Categories of Terrorist Acts,” Human Rights Watch, May 17, 2014 <https://www.hrw.
org/news/2014/05/17/jordan-terrorism-amendments-threaten-rights> (accessed December 2, 2019).
response to such acts, writings, or speeches. More-
over, they do not require any disturbance of the re-
lationship with the foreign state or actual retaliation 
against Jordanians or their property. According to 
the Jordanian court of cassation’s decision, the leg-
islator does not require the occurrence of an ac-
tual disturbance in relations between Jordan and a 
foreign state, or the exposure of Jordan to terrorist 
attacks.12 This was the case, for example, of Hesham 
Alayasra, a student activist detained in July 2017, be-
cause he criticized the Jordanian government after a 
security guard killed two Jordanian nationals at the 
Israeli Embassy in Amman.
The Amendment and Broadening of the Anti-Ter-
rorism Law
In 2006, following the 2005 attacks in a hotel in Am-
man, Jordan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55. 
In 2014, the law was amended and broadened, allow-
ing for the criminalization of a wide range of activi-
ties that are not considered criminal by internation-
al law or related to any kind of violence. Arguably, 
the Anti-Terrorism Law includes many loose terms 
regarding what constitutes terrorism and does not 
specify what can be considered a terrorist act.13 For 
instance, Article 2 defines terrorist acts as every in-
tentional act intended to disturb public order, en-
danger public safety and security, or disturb na-
tional security by means of threats, intimidation, or 
violence. This broad and vague definition of terror-
ist acts expands the legal scope for prosecution and 
makes some activities or minor crimes punishable. In 
fact, the law broadens the definition of terrorism to 
include “disturbing [Jordan’s] relations with a foreign 
state,” although this crime already exists in Jordan’s 
Penal Code and is regularly used to punish peaceful 
criticism of foreign countries or their rulers. Thus, 
the amendments further stiffen penalties.14
Accordingly, this vague definition has opened the 
door to abuse and prosecution of many activists, 
peaceful demonstrators, and political opponents 
for “disturbing public order” or “disturbing relations 
with a foreign country.” This happened to Profes-
sor Amjad Qourshah, detained for three months in 
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2016 for “a video in which he criticized the partici-
pation of Jordan in the international coalition against 
the Islamic State as being part of the US agenda, 
which, in his opinion, was forcing the Arab States to 
fight a war that is not theirs.”15 New cases occurred 
on June 26, 2019, when Suhaib Nasrallah, Mohammad 
Abu Ajaj, and Malik al-Jizawi were arrested for par-
ticipating in a march in Amman protesting “the deal 
of the century.” The next day, the three protesters 
were prosecuted before the State Security Court and 
charged under the Anti-Terrorism Law for disturb-
ing [Jordan’s] relations with a foreign state. Accord-
ing to the detainees’ lawyer, Nour al-Imam, the case 
file shows that the charges are based on the accusa-
tion that they criticized the policies of Saudi Arabia.16
Moreover, another amendment to Article 3(e) of the 
2006 Anti-Terrorism Law punishes the use of infor-
mation systems or media tools to “facilitate the con-
duct of terrorist acts or support terrorist groups, or 
an organization that performs acts of terrorism or 
market its ideas or funds it, or conducts any acts that 
subject Jordanians or their property to acts of hos-
tility or reprisals.” This amendment does not clearly 
define what kind of action constitutes “supporting” a 
terrorist act. Such wordings are vague enough to al-
low governments to consider media outlets report-
ing on terrorism or terrorist attacks to themselves 
be promoting terrorism.17 This was the case of Ghazi 
al-Marayat, a journalist at the government-con-
trolled al-Rai newspaper, who was detained by the 
authorities who “alleged that he violated a media gag 
by publishing details about a foiled terrorism plot. 
They held him for four days for investigation under 
a vaguely worded provision of the counterterrorism 
law before releasing him on bail. But he could still 
face criminal charges.”18
The Anti-Terrorism Law Expands the Powers of the 
State Security Court
Another issue is the expansion of the powers of the 
State Security Court. Article 8 of the Anti- Terrorism 
Law stipulates that: “the State Security Court shall 
15 Inès Osman, “10 years on: Jordan’s anti-terrorism law and the crackdown on dissent,” Open Democracy, October 31, 2016, available at <https://www.
opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/10-years-on-jordan-s-anti-terrorism-law-and-crackdown-on-dissent/> (accessed December 2, 2019).
16 “The Continuous Detention Of Prisoners Of Conscience In Jordan Is A Serious Escalation,” Sky Line International, 2019 <https://skylineforhuman.org/
en/the-continuous-detention-of-prisoners-of-conscience-in-jordan-is-a-serious-escalation/< (accessed December 11, 2019).
17 Albert Caramés and Júlia Fernàndez, “No security without rights: Human rights violations in the Euro-Mediterranean region as a consequence of anti-
terrorist legislations,’’ NOVACT International Institute for Nonviolent Action and OPEV Observatory to Prevent Extremist Violence, 2017 <https://novact.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/No-Security-Without-Rights.WEB_.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019).
18 “Jordan: Journalists, Writers Facing Terrorism Charges,” Human Rights Watch, July 15, 2015 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/15/jordan-
journalists-writers-facing-terrorism-charges> (accessed December 2, 2019).
19 Mohammad Ersan, “Is Jordan’s state security court threat to freedom of expression?”, Al-Monitor, February 21, 2017 <https://www.al-monitor.com/
pulse/originals/2017/02/jordan-civilian-trials-charges-activists-arrest.html> (accessed December 2, 2019).
20 “Undermining Justice: Prosecuting Activists in the State Security Court,” 7iber, November 12, 2013 <https://www.7iber.com/2013/11/martial-secret-
and-above-standards-of-justice-prosecuting-activists-before-the-state-security-court/> (accessed December 2, 2019). 
be competent in examining the crimes stipulated in 
the present law.” This article allows activists to be 
charged before Jordan’s State Security Court, a mil-
itary court with some civilian judges, on charges re-
lated to protests against austerity policies, perceived 
corruption, and of criminalization of peaceful ex-
pression, under the pretext of the fight against ex-
tremism. Unfortunately, this law expanded the pow-
ers of the court, so that the freedom of opinion and 
expression fall within the concept of terrorism.
Saleh al-Armouti, a member of parliament and for-
mer head of the Jordanian Bar Association, com-
ments on this law saying: “Giving further powers to 
the State Security Court is unconstitutional as this 
is a special court that encroaches upon the judicia-
ry. It is the prime minister who appoints civilian and 
military judges in the State Security Court. Conse-
quently, this court is not recognized by Interpol. […] 
The court prosecutor is based in the General Intel-
ligence Department, which morally, psychologically, 
and financially affects the course of the investigation. 
The trial of civilians should be moved to the public 
prosecutor.”19
The State Security Court trials are problematic in 
two ways. First, they contradict Article 101 of the 
amended Jordanian Constitution that ensures that 
the courts shall be open to all and free from any in-
terference in its affairs, and that the courts’ hearings 
and verdict shall be public unless the court decides 
that they should be held in secret in the interest of 
public order or morals. Civilians may not be tried in 
a criminal case before a court which is not entire-
ly composed of civilian judges, except for crimes 
of treason, espionage, terrorism, drugs, and mon-
ey counterfeiting. Article 8 illegally prosecutes civil-
ians, human rights activists, and journalists before 
the State Security Court for expressing their opinion. 
Second, this court violates the standards for fair trial 
detailed in international human rights covenants and 
conventions ratified by Jordan: “Every person has 
the right to a fair and public trial by a specialized, 
independent, and non-biased judge and jury.”20 That 
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is because Article 8 of the State Security Court Law 
gives it the right to conduct a trial in secret under 
its own “discretion,” and there are no clear standards 
defining “discretion” in this instance.21
The Press and Publications Law
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked Jordan 130 
out of 180 countries with regards to press freedom in 
2019.22 Under the umbrella of Press and Publications 
Laws that use vague and loose phrases such as media 
ethics, principles of freedom, and national responsi-
bility, the Jordanian authorities seem to violate these 
laws without any explanation.23 Article 5 of the Press 
and Publications Law emphasizes that “the publica-
tion shall search for the truth and adhere to accura-
cy, neutrality, and objectivity in publishing journalis-
tic material and refrain from publishing anything that 
conflicts with the principles of freedom, national re-
sponsibility, human rights, and values of the Arab and 
Islamic nation.”24 According to RSF, by using unprec-
edented censorship, at least four Jordanian journal-
ists were prevented from publishing articles criti-
cal of the US-led Bahrain conference on a potential 
Middle East peace plan. One of them, Majed Tobeh, 
wrote in a Facebook post that he had “described the 
peace plan as ‘science fiction’ for the Palestinians but 
had not mentioned Jordan’s participation.”25 Still, he 
faced problems to publish his article. 
21 Ibid.
22 “2019 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, 2019 <https://rsf.org/en/ranking#> (accessed December 2, 2019). 
23 Khair Ban Doumi M, “Public Freedoms in the Jordanian Constitution: Rhetoric and Realities,” Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism (8)4, 2018, 
p. 6.
24 “The Press and Publication Law of 1998 and its Amendments,” UNESCO Amman Office <http://www.medialegalsupport.jo/en/node/86< (accessed 
December 11, 2019).
25 “Jordan suppresses articles criticizing Bahrain conference,” Reporters Without Borders, June 28, 2019, updated July 2, 2019 <https://rsf.org/en/news/
jordan-suppresses-articles-criticizing-bahrain-conference> (accessed December 2, 2019). 
26 Thoraya El-Rayyes, “Enhancing Internet Media Freedom in Jordan,” 7iber, April 2, 2015, pp. 1-53 >https://www.7iber.com/research/enhancing-internet-
media-freedom-in-jordan/< (accessed December 11, 2019).
27 Toby Mendel, “Jordan: Analysis of the Press and Publications Law, 1998, as Amended,” UNESCO Amman Office, 2016, p.3 <https://en.unesco.org/sites/
default/files/updatedjordan.ppl-analysis.16-05-18ls-1.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019).
28 “Freedom on the Net 2018 - Jordan,” Freedom House published by UNHCR, November 1, 2018 <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be16b0dc.html> 
(accessed December 2, 2019). 
Moreover, in 2011, press law amendments officially 
added news websites to the definition of press pub-
lications. Further amendments in 2012 to the Press 
and Publications Law solidified the government’s grip 
over those online spaces that “publish news, investi-
gations, articles, or comments, related to the inter-
nal or external affairs of the Kingdom.”26 At the same 
time, Jordan’s telecommunications regulator blocked 
hundreds of websites for not being properly regis-
tered as required under the 2012 amendment. 
This step aims to regulate electronic publications 
by extending requirements governing print media 
to electronic news sites based on articles 48 and 49. 
According to these articles, Jordanian news web-
sites must employ a full-time editor in chief, who 
has been a member of the Jordan Press Association 
for at least four years. Editors and writers are legal-
ly responsible for an article’s content. The amend-
ments place strict conditions on online content and 
consider the owners and editor-in-chief responsible 
for the content of third-party comments, which are 
considered to be “journalistic material.” Only com-
ments related to the topic of the news article are al-
lowed and websites must keep records of comments 
for six months, including information about the indi-
vidual who posted them.27
Furthermore, articles 48 and 49 enable the head of 
the Media Commission to block any website for fail-
ing to obtain a license or, more broadly, for violat-
ing Jordanian law. The law’s expansive definition of a 
news website could be interpreted to include almost 
all Jordanian and international websites, blogs, por-
tals, and social networks.28
The Cybercrime Law
In 2015, the Cybercrime Law was introduced, consti-
tuting an updated edition of the Information System 
Crime Law, which the government passed as a tem-
porary law in 2010, in the absence of a parliament at 
The cybercrime law places 
undue restrictions on            
the freedom of expression
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the time. The draft amendments to Cybercrime Law 
No. 27 of 2015 are currently under consideration by 
the Jordanian Senate.29
This law is a double-edged sword. Although Jor-
dan’s Cybercrime Law is necessary and important 
to combat many crimes, the current law places un-
due restrictions on the freedom of expression, free-
dom of the press, media freedom, and personal lib-
erties. The latest amendments to Cybercrime Law 
No. 27 include an article that defines and criminal-
izes hate speech as “every writing and every speech 
or action intended to provoke sectarian or racial se-
dition, advocate violence or foster conflict between 
followers of different religions and various compo-
nents of the nation.”30 This vague and inaccurate lan-
guage opens the door for interpretations of certain 
online content regardless of whether it is intended to 
incite hatred, harm, or even pose a threat. Moreover, 
the amended text would serve to confuse between 
hate speech and legitimate criticism of public fig-
ures on social media.31 Due to the absence of a pub-
lic discourse regarding specific standards of harm-
ful speech that warrant legal action, classifying any 
speech as “hate speech” will represent yet another 
tool to impose more restrictions on the freedom of 
expression under the guise of protecting groups.32 
The number of Jordanians detained for expressing 
their opinion could dramatically increase due to this 
very vague definition of hate speech. 
Furthermore, the amendment of Article 2 of the Cy-
bercrime Law extends its reach to applications such 
as WhatsApp and Viber, as well as  online platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. This direct-
ly affects freedom of expression by regulating activi-
ties on such platforms.33 According to Article 11, any-
one who intentionally sends, re-shares, or publishes 
information or data that entail slander, defamation, 
or libel using the internet, websites or any informa-
tion systems, faces three to six months in prison and 
a fine between 100 and 2,000 Jordanian dinar. This 
would mean that people could be imprisoned sim-
29 “The Right to Freedom of Expression Online in Jordan,” International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 2019 <http://www.icnl.org/news/2019/Guide%20
to%20Internet%20freedoms%20in%20Jordan-English.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2019).
30 “MPs reject new amendments to Cybercrime Law,” The Jordan Times, February 19, 2019 <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/mps-reject-new-
amendments-cybercrime-law> (accessed December 11, 2019).
31 Dima Samaro and Emna Sayadi, “Cybercrime law in Jordan: pushing back on new amendments that could harm free expression and violate privacy,” 
Accessnow, February 19, 2019 <https://www.accessnow.org/cybercrime-law-in-jordan-pushing-back-on-new-amendments-that-could-harm-free-
expression-and-violate-privacy/> (accessed December 2, 2019).
32 Reem Almasri, “Cyber Crime Law: How does the government control the online platform?,” 7iber, January 30, 2018 <https://www.7iber.com/technology/
cyber-crime-law-how-does-the-government-control-the-online-platform/> (accessed December 11, 2019).
33 Samaro and Sayadi, “Cybercrime law in Jordan.” 
34 Heba Morayef, “Jordan: Government should withdraw amendments to cybercrimes law ahead of UN review,” Amnesty International, November 7, 2018 
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/11/jordan-government-should-withdraw-amendments-to-cybercrimes-law-ahead-of-un-review/> 
(accessed December 2, 2019).
35 “Amendments to Jordan’s Cybercrime Law risk curbing free speech online,” MENA Rights, November 21, 2018 <https://menarights.org/en/articles/
amendments-jordans-cybercrime-law-risk-curbing-free-speech-online> (accessed December 2, 2019).
ply for sharing an article that is alleged to include 
slander on social media.34 As a result, this has cre-
ated problems by limiting people’s online activities, 
especially journalists who practice their publishing 
rights online. For example, in May 2017, anti-corrup-
tion activist Husam al-Abdallat was arrested after a 
complaint was filed against him by two public offi-
cials for having criticized corruption within the Jor-
danian government on Facebook.35
Moreover, Article 12 (A) criminalizes “anyone who in-
tentionally and without authorization or in violation 
or excess of an authorization accesses a website or 
information system in any manner with the purpose 
of viewing data or information that is not available 
to the public and which touches national security, 
foreign relations of the Kingdom, general securi-
ty or national economy.” The article does not define 
the meaning of “general safety” or “national security,” 
which creates the possibility to arrest individuals for 
a range of trivial matters, especially if a claim can be 
combined with the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law. In ad-
dition, it is not clear what sort of documents or in-
formation threaten Jordanian public order and sta-
bility. The government has used these laws to unduly 
restrict rules on the content of what may be pub-
lished and to place extensive limitations on freedom 
of expression to protect national security. This has 
led to the imprisonment of people solely for practic-
ing their right to freedom of expression, and further 
encourages self-censorship in cyberspace. 
Recommendations
 - Review the laws and revise proposed amendments 
to comply with the provisions of the Jordanian Con-
stitution and international standards 
To this end, all relevant domestic actors, including 
the government, lawmakers, political parties and 
leaders, civil society and human rights advocates 
should engage in a national dialogue to find a better 
way to improve and protect the status of freedom of 
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expression in Jordan. This includes: ensuring that the 
legal limitations placed on freedom of expression are 
legitimate, necessary, proportional, and meet inter-
national standards; and refraining from prosecuting 
or penalizing journalists and activists for performing 
their legitimate work, including through their online 
activities.
 - Amend or eliminate all vague phrases, and provide 
clear definitions of any legal limitations 
Articles 110 to 153, and 118 of the Penal Code of 1960 
as well as Article 11 of the Cybercrime Law should be 
amended to eliminate any lack of precision, vague 
terms and broad wording. Further amendments 
are required of legal texts that serve to equate hate 
speech and legitimate criticism of public figures on 
social media. Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Law should clearly define what constitutes “terror-
ism,” what is meant by a “terrorist act,” and what kind 
of action may be considered to constitute “support-
ing” a terrorist act. should be amended. Moreover, a 
public discourse is required regarding the definition 
of hate speech contained in the latest amendments 
to Cybercrime Law No. 27 of 2015.
 - Limit the power of the State Security Court
The right to a fair, truthful, and public trial should 
be provided by means of a specialized, independent, 
and non-biased judge and jury. Therefore, Jordan 
should stop prosecuting civilians before the State 
Security Court, and limit the State Security Court’s 
jurisdiction to cases of high treason, espionage, and 
terrorism, with citizens being otherwise tried in ci-
vilian courts. Hence, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror-
ism Law should be made compatible with Article 101 
of the Constitution, which forbids the prosecution 
of any civilian in a criminal case unless all appoint-
ed judges are civilians; the exceptions are charges of 
treason, espionage, terrorism, drugs, and currency 
counterfeit.
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PRO-IRANIAN MILITIAS AT 
THE KINGDOM’S DOORSTEP - 
IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN’S 
FOREIGN POLICY AND RESPONSE 
OPTIONS
Chonlawit Sirikupt
* Note: The editorial closure date was 22.11.2019
Iraq’s military victory over the so-called Islamic State 
(IS) in 2017 has set the stage for a fresh chapter in Jor-
danian-Iraqi relations, starting with a revival of trade 
and a revitalization of economic cooperation, poised 
to generate benefits for both countries. However, the 
intensifying competition between the US and Iran in 
Iraq could set the clock back on these positive develop-
ments. Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, already suspected 
of launching attacks on US assets earlier in May 2019 
and firing on demonstrators during recent protests in 
Baghdad and various southern towns, have been oper-
ating outside of proper central oversight. Allegations 
that some groups are in possession of Iranian-supplied 
weapons create the conditions under which Jordan’s 
allies and partners, such as the US and Israel, might 
be compelled to abandon restraint in favor of tougher 
measures such as expanded sanctions and preventive 
strikes. As the Iraqi Prime Minister attempts to merge 
the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) militias with the 
Iraqi armed forces, Amman should signal support for 
his integration plan while urging Baghdad to address 
lapses in the process through active back-channel dip-
lomatic engagements. Going forward, Jordanian pol-
icymakers should be prepared to take the following 
steps: urge Baghdad to take immediate action against 
the illegal movements of weapons and material, culti-
vate dialogues with Tehran on peace and security in 
Iraq, and encourage Jordanian companies to enhance 
their sanctions compliance schemes. 
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the US and Iran, 
as well as their allies in Baghdad, have become en-
meshed in a competition to reshape the Iraqi po-
1 “Legislative Efforts to Expel U.S. Troops from Iraq, Alongside Shi’ite Militias’ Threats to Force Them Out,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, 
March 6, 2019 <https://www.memri.org/reports/legislative-efforts-expel-us-troops-iraq-alongside-shiite-militias-threats-force-them-out> (accessed 
December 3, 2019).
2 Sasha Ingber, “Trump Orders an Additional 1,500 Troops to the Middle East,” NPR, May 24, 2019 <https://www.npr.org/2019/05/24/726680414/
trump-orders-an-additional-1-500-troops-to-the-middle-east> (accessed December 3, 2019).
3 “Missiles hit Iraq base hosting US troops,” Rudaw, June 18, 2019 <https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/170620193> (accessed December 3, 
2019).  
4 Seth G. Jones et al., “Iran’s Threat to Saudi Critical Infrastructure: The Implications of U.S.-Iranian Escalation,” Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, August 5, 2019 <https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-threat-saudi-critical-infrastructure-implications-us-iranian-escalation> (accessed December 
3, 2019).
5 The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Legislative Efforts To Expel U.S. Troops from Iraq,”; Ghassan Adnan and Isabel Coles, “Pro-Iran Militias 
Denounce Rocket Strike Near U.S. Embassy in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2019 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/pro-iran-militias-denounce-rocket-
strike-near-u-s-embassy-in-iraq-11558355575> (accessed December 3, 2019).
6 Jones et al., “Iran’s Threat to Saudi Critical Infrastructure.”
7 Michael Knights, “Exposing and Sanctioning Human Rights Violations by Iraqi Militias,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 22, 2019 
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/exposing-and-sanctioning-human-rights-violations-by-iraqi-militias> (accessed December 3, 
2019).
litical, security, and economic landscape. Recent-
ly, the escalations between Washington and Tehran 
have reinforced these existing battle lines. During 
the summer of 2019, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq were 
suspected of launching attacks on US military, dip-
lomatic, and commercial assets around the coun-
try against the backdrop of legislative efforts to evict 
US forces and explicit threats made by some militia 
representatives.1
In May, a Katyusha rocket landed in Baghdad’s Green 
Zone near the US Embassy, prompting the Trump 
administration to deploy 1,500 additional US troops 
to the Persian Gulf.2 In what seemed to be a reac-
tion to the troop deployments, three rockets of the 
same type were fired at Camp Taji where US person-
nel are stationed.3 Similar hard-to-attribute attacks 
have also been launched against US allies in the re-
gion.4 Although some Iranian partners such as the 
Houthis have publicly claimed attacks against Sau-
di assets, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq that previous-
ly made threats against US troops came out and 
denounced the attacks in Baghdad. Kata’ib Hezbol-
lah (KH), whose military spokesman Ja’far Hussei-
ni stated in February that the US forces constitute 
“a legitimate threat for the Iraqi resistance, and the 
[Iraqi] security apparatuses should also view them as 
a target,” called the rocket attacks unjustified.5 The 
opaque conditions associated with these irregu-
lar attacks undermine regional stability and Jordan’s 
strategic interests with Iraq.6 While pro-Iranian mi-
litias in Iraq might not pose a direct and immediate 
threat to the Kingdom, Amman is likely to feel the 
impact of their actions that threaten Iraq’s stability.  
During recent demonstrations that broke out in ear-
ly October in Baghdad and various southern towns, 
certain militia formations were responsible for snip-
er attacks against protest leaders and attacks on 
television stations.7 Furthermore, the ways in which 
Amman’s allies and partners such as the US and Is-
rael react to what they perceive as threats to their 
Chapter III: Regional Dynamics and Their Impact on Jordan
35No. 6 | Januar 2020
REPORT
security and strategic interests in the region could 
draw the Kingdom closer toward the melee against 
its will. In August, a series of explosions occurred 
at weapons storage facilities controlled by the mili-
tias. Two US officials alleged that Israel was behind 
at least one strike inside Iraq, although Tel Aviv has 
neither denied nor confirmed its involvement.8 These 
series of escalations risk unraveling the positive 
strides made in efforts to revitalize Jordanian-Iraqi 
relations in the aftermath of the expulsion of IS from 
its strongholds in Iraq.
Militia Activities Complicate the Revitalization of 
Jordanian-Iraqi Relations
In the period following the Iraqi military’s victo-
ry over the so-called Islamic State (IS) in late 2017, 
high-level meetings between Jordanian and Iraqi 
heads of states, accompanied by the revival of trade 
links and a revitalization of economic cooperation, 
speak to the power of reconciliation and amity. The 
current year began with a historic visit by King Ab-
dullah II to Baghdad, where he met with President 
Barham Salih, paving the way for the signing of a ma-
jor economic agreement between Jordan and Iraq in 
February 2019.9 Under the framework, Jordan agreed 
to supply electricity in exchange for 10,000 barrels of 
Iraqi oil, and in September, the first daily shipment 
of crude oil from Kirkuk arrived in Amman.10 The two 
sides also confirmed they were resuming studies of 
a potential pipeline project from Basra in southern 
Iraq to the Red Sea port of Aqaba, which could po-
tentially increase Iraq’s oil exports and provide Jor-
dan with stable transit revenues.11 Nevertheless, the 
ability of both sides to collaboratively harness their 
economic potential could be disrupted by the unreg-
ulated activities of pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, which 
have been carving out exclusive principalities in the 
local security and economic landscapes. 
The forces at the center of recent controversies, 
which Washington has framed as Iran’s “proxies” in 
8 Alissa J. Rubin and Ronen Bergman, “Israeli Airstrike Hits Weapons Depot in Iraq,” The New York Times, August 22, 2019 <https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/08/22/world/middleeast/israel-iraq-iran-airstrike.html> (accessed December 3, 2019).
9 Abdulwahab Al-Qassab, “Iran Should Worry about New Iraq-Jordan Relations,” Arab Center Washington DC, February 13, 2019 <http://arabcenterdc.
org/policy_analyses/iran-should-worry-about-new-iraq-jordan-relations/> (accessed December 3, 2019).
10 “Jordan receives 1st shipment of Iraqi oil,” Xinhua, September 5, 2019 <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-09/05/c_138365529.htm> (accessed 
December 3, 2019).
11 Abdulwahab Al-Qassab, “Iran Should Worry about New Iraq-Jordan Relations.”
12 Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2017), pp. 6-7.
13 Michael Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq: The New Special Groups.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, August 2019 <https://ctc.
usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/> (accessed December 3, 2019).
14  Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Anthony C. Pfaff, “How to Counter Iran’s Proxies,” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2019 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/how-to-counter-
iran-s-proxies> (accessed December 3, 2019).
17 “Iraqi PM decree curbs powers of Iranian-allied militias,” Al-Jazeera, July 1, 2019 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/iraqi-pm-orders-iranian-
Iraq, are a large constellation of various militias unit-
ed under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF), an entity formed by a combination of 
executive decrees and religious fatwas to fight IS.12 
The organization has become increasingly dominat-
ed by its Shia core that is linked to Iran, which in-
cludes older pro-Iranian militias that were previously 
flagged by the US as “Special Groups” and designat-
ed as terrorist organizations in some cases.13 Since 
the US troop withdrawal in 2011, the range of Spe-
cial Groups with links to the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) has diversified.14 Unlike previous 
militias that were tolerated and controlled by Bagh-
dad, the Special Groups in post-2014 Iraq are already 
operating outside the formal chain of command.15 
While Iran might not directly control the military op-
erations of the Special Groups, it still provides them 
with considerable financial and military assistance, 
as well as a general orientation that identifies the US 
and its allies as enemies.16
Eager to avoid having Iraq become the main battle-
ground of a catastrophic US-Iran war, Prime Minis-
ter Adel Abd Mahdi issued a decree on July 1, 2019, 
requiring that the PMF merge and operate under the 
same command structure as the Iraqi armed forces.17 
The decree also demands that the militias close their 
headquarters, choose between either military or po-
litical functions, relinquish their names in favor of 
The Special Groups in       
post-2014 Iraq are operating 
outside the formal chain           
of command
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Iraqi military designations, and abandon all econom-
ic activities.18 Those groups failing to comply by July 
31 would be deemed as outlaws. 
However, Baghdad’s seemingly minimal efforts in im-
plementing the order have sparked concerns about 
the extent to which the decree would effectively 
subject militia formations within the PMF to the for-
mal chain of command.19 Mahdi’s immediate prede-
cessor, Haider al-Abadi, had issued his own decree in 
March 2018 with the aim of subjecting the militias to 
the rules and regulations governing the Iraqi Army – 
but with little success.20 For instance, a base in Jurf 
al-Sakhar, which has been operated by KH, was re-
portedly the launch point for drone attacks on Sau-
di oil facilities in May.21 These kinds of irregular ac-
tivities have fueled suspicions that the decree’s real 
objective could be to provide legal and political cov-
er for pro-Iranian militias as opposed to enacting 
meaningful reforms.22
In fact, groups that have accepted Mahdi’s decree 
not only have extensive ties to the IRGC, but they 
also constitute a significant portion of the PMF 
and its most militarily capable element. These in-
clude US-designated foreign terrorist organizations 
allied-militia-reined-190701183850760.html> (accessed December 3, 2019).
18 John Hannah, “Iran-Backed Militias Are in Iraq to Stay,” Foreign Policy, July 31, 2019 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/31/iran-backed-militias-are-
in-iraq-to-stay/> (accessed December 3, 2019).
19 Michael Knights, “Helping Iraq Take Charge of Its Command-and-Control Structure,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 30, 2019 
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/helping-iraq-take-charge-of-its-command-and-control-structure> (accessed December 3, 
2019).
20 Hannah, “Iran-Backed Militias Are in Iraq to Stay.”
21 Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello, “Militias Are Threatening Public Safety in Iraq,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 14, 2019 
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/militias-are-threatening-public-safety-in-iraq> (accessed December 3, 2019).
22 Ibid.
23 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.” 
24 Alec Worsnop, Organization and Community: The Determinants of Military Effectiveness, PhD Thesis (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2016), p. 382.
25 Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8 (2018), p. 20.
26 Michael Knights and Assaf Orion, “If Iran Deploys Missiles in Iraq: U.S.-Israeli Response Options,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 13, 




29 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.”
30 UN Security Council Resolution 2231, S/RES/2231, July 20, 2015 <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2231> (accessed December 3, 2019). 
such as KH and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HaN), 
as well as the Badr Brigades and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.23 
Badr, for instance, has been a longstanding recipi-
ent of direct Iranian support that included hands-on 
training and assistance in designing organizational 
features, in addition to significant weaponry, ammu-
nition, and cash.24 Over the years, Iran has reported-
ly provided more military components to other non-
state partners, which have enabled them to develop a 
range of advanced weapon systems. The Burkan 2-H 
medium-range ballistic missile, derived from Iran’s 
Qiam-1 missile, were used by the Houthis to strike 
Riyadh and the port city of Yanbu from northern Ye-
men in 2017 and 2018.25
These developments suggest that Tehran could help 
newer Special Groups like KH improve their mili-
tary capabilities. In fact, there are mounting con-
cerns among Iraqi and US intelligence that Iran is co-
vertly supplying long-range artillery rockets to KH, 
HaN, and potentially Badr.26 These groups have re-
portedly developed exclusive use of military bases 
in the governorates of Diyala, Salahuddin, Baghdad, 
Karbala, and Wasit.27 It is also suspected that these 
militias have established a secure line of communi-
cation and control to Iran through Diyala in eastern 
Iraq, allowing them to import weapons and materi-
al without central government approval or knowl-
edge.28 In Anbar, KH reportedly controls the Husay-
bah Point of Entry, where their military vehicles can 
enter and exit Iraq without formal customs inspec-
tions.29 The supply of rockets and missile equipment, 
which violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, 
could provide an enhanced strike capability against 
US forces and allies in the region.30
The IRGC has also been active in countering the re-
cent waves of protests in Iraq. Major General Qas-
A unified and stable Iraq 
is needed to revitalize 
Jordanian-Iraqi relations
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sem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC’s Quds 
Force, reportedly arrived in Baghdad to help draw up 
tougher counter-protest measures alongside certain 
PMF formations and Iraqi political figures, including 
providing intelligence materials on activists and cre-
ating secure communication lines for the snipers.31 
According to one Iraqi source interviewed by Reu-
ters, “the snipers were elements of militias report-
ing directly to their commander instead of the chief 
commander of the armed forces.”32
From the creeping expansion of bases to employing 
violence outside the formal chain of command, these 
irregular activities threaten the foundation of a uni-
fied and stable Iraq that is needed to revitalize Jor-
danian-Iraqi relations. Moreover, bilateral relations 
could hit a stumbling block as they reinforce the 
clear and present danger of what Jordan’s allies and 
partners perceive as Iranian “provocations.” Under 
such circumstances, some of them might feel com-
pelled to expand sanctions against militia and affil-
iated figures, or move away from deterrence in fa-
vor of using lethal force to raise the costs and risks of 
Iran’s behaviors in Iraq.
Option 1 - Maintain the Status Quo  
The Kingdom could maintain the current status quo 
and steer clear of becoming involved in Iraq’s inter-
nal affairs. A strict policy of non-interference could 
benefit Jordan’s security because there are no spe-
cific physical or rhetorical indications that pro-Irani-
an militias in Iraq pose a direct and immediate threat 
to the Kingdom. Nor have Jordanian diplomatic and 
commercial assets been targeted. As a result, involv-
ing the Kingdom in Iraqi political and security af-
fairs could antagonize certain militia formations in 
the PMF and encourage anti-Jordanian sentiments 
among their political allies in the Iraqi parliament, 
who might set out to curtail Baghdad’s relations with 
Amman. 
However, the fragile political and security situation 
in Iraq indicate that the current status quo is unsus-
31 Knights, “Exposing and Sanctioning Human Rights Violations by Iraqi Militias.”
32 “Exclusive: Iran-backed militias deployed snipers in Iraq protests – sources,” Reuters, October 17, 2019 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-
protests-iran-snipers-exclusive/exclusive-iran-backed-militias-deployed-snipers-in-iraq-protests-sources-idUSKBN1WW0B1> (accessed December 3, 
2019). 
33 Omar Al-Nidawi, “The growing economic and political role of Iraq’s PMF,” Middle East Institute, May 21, 2019 <https://www.mei.edu/publications/
growing-economic-and-political-role-iraqs-pmf> (accessed December 3, 2019).
34 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.”
35 US Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Persons Associated with Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corrupt Actors in Iraq, July 18, 2019 
<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm735> (accessed December 3, 2019).
36 Michael Knights, “Sanctions on Iraqi Political Figures: Shaping the Impact and Message,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 19, 2019 
<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/sanctions-on-iraqi-political-figures-shaping-the-impact-and-message> (accessed December 
3, 2019).
37 Raphael Ahren, “Netanyahu hints Israel behind strikes on Iraq, says Iran not immune anywhere,” The Times of Israel, August 20, 2019 <https://www.
tainable and, if not carefully controlled by the central 
authorities in Iraq, could open the door to provoc-
ative actions that hinder efforts at revitalizing eco-
nomic and diplomatic relations between Jordan and 
Iraq. In some governorates, pro-Iranian militias in 
Iraq have also been exerting increased control over 
state-owned engineering and construction compa-
nies, as well as interfering in the functions of land 
and seaports after the expulsion of IS.33 In Basra 
for instance, some piers at Umm Qasr port and the 
Shalamcheh land border-crossing to Iran are mili-
tia-controlled smuggling routes for Iraqi crude oil.34 
The militia penetration of the local Iraqi economy 
has prompted the US government to impose new 
sanctions on four Iraqi citizens, one of whom is a 
former Iraqi governor who “has been known to pro-
tect his personal interests by accommodating Iran-
backed proxies that operate outside of state con-
trol.”35 These sanctions, while demonstrating US 
resolve, also send a clear signal to Iraq and region-
al allies on the urgent need to deter the militias from 
further penetration of local economic structures and 
governing institutions.36 Based on these consider-
ations, opting to maintain the status quo could ex-
pose Jordanian companies to the greater risk of be-
ing caught up in the web of US sanctions, given that 
some service providers in the financial services and 
logistics sectors could be exploited by third parties 
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of US-desig-
nated foreign terrorist organizations or individuals, 
to illegally transfer payments, assets, and material. 
Furthermore, Iraq’s weak oversight over the illegal 
movements of weapons and equipment across the 
country by certain militia formations within the PMF 
could elicit provocative operations from outside its 
borders. The Israeli leadership has already firmly ex-
pressed that Iranian-backed forces have no immuni-
ty anywhere, and signaled that Israel would contin-
ue to act militarily whenever and wherever there is a 
need to do so.37 Therefore, unregulated activities that 
lead Israel to suspect that an attack on its territory 
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might be in preparation could compel its leadership 
to prioritize preventive attacks over restraint.
Option 2 – Restore Full Diplomatic Relations with 
Iran 
Jordan could restore full diplomatic relations with 
Iran, which cooled when the Jordanian ambassador 
was recalled in April 2018.38 Diplomatic normaliza-
tion at the ambassadorial level would render Jordan 
an indispensable mediator between Washington and 
Tehran. This could improve contingent communica-
tion channels that allow points of contention over 
Iranian-related activities in Iraq to be addressed in 
a timely manner. However, Washington and Riyadh’s 
commitment to the Trump administration’s poli-
cy of “maximum pressure” suggests that a full diplo-
matic restoration with Tehran diverges too far from 
the policies of its core allies. Similarly, Amman made 
veiled threats against Houthi rebels for their attack 
on a Saudi airport in June.39 A sudden rapproche-
ment with Iran without proper sequencing would not 
only damage Jordan’s credibility in the eyes of the US 
and Saudi Arabia but could also affect future consid-
erations for military and economic assistance to the 
Kingdom.  
Option 3 – Signal Support for Baghdad’s Integra-
tion of the PMF into the Iraqi Armed Forces
Jordan’s efforts to support the integration of the PMF 
into the armed forces from the side would bring Am-
man in alignment with the preferences of promi-
nent Shia nationalists, including those with whom 
the Kingdom has cultivated ties. Moqtada al-Sadr, for 
instance, has publicly expressed his support for the 
plan and urged his militia, Saraya al-Salam, to close 
its headquarters and disband.40 In fact, pressures 
from Iraq’s Shia religious establishment led Prime 
Minister Mahdi to issue executive orders 237 and 
328, which respectively set the scope for establish-
ing operational control over all PMF formations and 
the reorganization of the PMF leadership structure.41 
timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-hints-israel-behind-strikes-on-iraq-says-iran-not-immune-anywhere/> (accessed December 3, 2019).
38 Miriam Malek, “Jordan Recalls Ambassador From Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2016 <https://www.wsj.com/articles/jordan-recalls-ambassador-
from-iran-1460979410> (accessed December 3, 2019).
39 Arab News, International condemnation of Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abha airport, June 12, 2019 <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1509916/
saudi-arabia> (accessed December 3, 2019).
40 Ali Mamouri, “Iraq orders militias to fully integrate into state security forces,” Al-Monitor, July 2, 2019 <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
originals/2019/07/iraq-pmu-iran-abdul-mahdi-shiite-militias.html> (accessed December 3, 2019).
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43 Jennifer Cafarella et al., ISIS’S Second Comeback: Assessing the Next IS Insurgency (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2019), p. 28.
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45 Knights, “Iran’s Expanding Militia Army in Iraq.”
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While this option forces Jordan to reconcile with 
the reality that pro-Iranian commanders and lead-
ership figures in the PMF would be provided with 
some degree of formal power and access to Iraqi 
state resources, the ongoing integration process 
gives Amman a window of opportunity to leverage 
its back-channel communications with counterparts 
in Tehran to advocate for a unified Iraq. King Abdul-
lah II’s brief meeting with President Hassan Rou-
hani on the sidelines of the emergency summit of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Istan-
bul in 2018 suggests that cultivating dialogues about 
regional stability and peace is still possible.42 At the 
same time, it also provides Amman with addition-
al opportunities to take advantage of its close dip-
lomatic ties with Baghdad to discuss the plan’s po-
tential impact on the Kingdom’s security, as well as 
potential solutions towards de-escalation between 
the US and Iran.
Furthermore, in the light of IS’s creeping resurgence, 
signaling support for the PMF’s integration allows 
Amman to strike a compromise between autonomy 
and demobilization, which could benefit both Jorda-
nian and Iraqi strategic interests.43 Iraqi counterof-
fensives from 2016 to 2017 indicate that groups such 
as Badr boast a strong cadre system and functionally 
differentiated units that put them in a much stronger 
position than many Sunni tribal militias to push back 
the insurgency.44 Moreover, it demonstrates Amman’s 
sensitivity to the interests of Iraq’s Shia population 
that could help forge closer ties with key figures in 
the community. Public support for the PMF remains 
strong and the entity itself is still highly respected by 
the Iraqi Shia majority for having answered the call 
to defend Iraq’s territorial integrity in June 2014.45 
Many average Iraqi citizens have relatives who joined 
the PMF for the benefit of the country, not for Iran or 
pro-Iranian militia leaders.46
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Recommendations
Signaling support for Baghdad’s plan to integrate the 
PMF into the Iraqi armed forces is the most prudent 
course of action for dealing with the opaque activi-
ties of pro-Iranian militias in Iraq that might create 
conditions under which provocative responses with 
potentially destabilizing effects might arise. Jordani-
an policymakers should be prepared to take the fol-
lowing steps to balance the Kingdom’s strategic in-
terests with regional stability.
 - Urge Baghdad to act against the illegal movement of 
weapons and material
Amman should urge Baghdad to enhance the man-
agement of government stockpiles, supported by 
robust control mechanisms over the distributions 
of munitions, as well as strengthening its border 
control procedures. High-ranking Jordanian offi-
cials should meet regularly with their Iraqi counter-
parts to stress the importance of revitalizing Jorda-
nian-Iraqi economic relations, but at the same time 
express concerns about the potential impact of un-
regulated militia activities on the safety and securi-
ty of Jordanian-Iraqi land trading routes, especially 
in Basra, where militia-controlled smuggling routes 
might threaten the success of the proposed Bas-
ra-Aqaba oil pipeline. Baghdad should also be re-
minded that these security concerns – which might 
potentially affect the safety of Jordanian citizens – 
could compel Amman to delay the implementation of 
the proposed joint Jordanian-Iraqi industrial zone at 
the border.47
 - Cultivate dialogues with Tehran on peace and secu-
rity in Iraq
While Amman might not be able to restore full dip-
lomatic relations with Tehran at the ambassadorial 
level under the current circumstances, it is imper-
ative that the Kingdom explore venues for commu-
nicating small measures of trust to its Iranian coun-
terparts. Multilateral formats such as the OIC, G77, 
World Economic Forum, and the United Nations 
General Assembly could serve as platforms for start-
ing and sustaining conversations on issues of mutual 
interests, including the security situation in Iraq and 
regional stability. Doing so would not only cultivate a 
sense of mutual respect between the two sides, but 
would also allow Amman to signal its strategic inter-
ests in the region to Tehran.
47 Mohammad Ghazal, “Studies underway for Jordan-Iraq industrial zone on border,” The Jordan Times, March 12, 2019 <http://www.jordantimes.com/
news/local/studies-underway-jordan-iraq-industrial-zone-border> (accessed December 11, 2019).
 - Encourage Jordanian companies to enhance their 
sanctions compliance schemes 
As the US begins to widen its sanctions campaign in 
Iraq to target Iranian partners and affiliates, Jordani-
an regulators should work with actors in the private 
sector – especially those in the financial services and 
logistics – to ensure that internal practices cultivate 
the culture and responsibility for sanctions compli-
ance among corporate leaders and employees who 
may feel that the rules do not apply to them. This 
process should be reinforced by investments in ro-
bust compliance schemes containing rigorous due 
diligence and risk assessments procedures in or-
der to reduce the extent to which Jordanian compa-
nies would be exposed to sanctions violations, and if 
any were to occur, this would increase the chances 
of leniency from US authorities. In addition, regula-
tors should urge companies to invest in technologi-
cal tools, such as software to screen customers and 
potential partners against the US Treasury’s Special-
ly Designated Nationals (SDN) lists in order to obtain 
a first indication of whether there are any potential 
red flags regarding a given transaction.
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AMMAN AND THE GCC CRISIS 
– A CASE FOR ENHANCED EU 
COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT AND 
OMAN
Antonino Occhiuto
The 2018 protests, triggered by the deteriorating eco-
nomic situation, have pushed Jordanians of diverse 
backgrounds onto the streets, and represent a major le-
gitimacy test for King Abdullah II and Jordan’s govern-
ment. At the same time, due to the ongoing crisis within 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – which includes 
some of Amman’s most important donors and trade 
partners – Saudi Arabia (KSA), Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) are increasingly subjecting eco-
nomic cooperation and aid to stringent political con-
ditions. This places further pressure on the already un-
stable financial outlook of the Hashemite Kingdom. In 
this context, EU policymakers should coordinate eco-
nomic aid with other third parties indirectly affected by 
the GCC split, such as Kuwait and Oman, which have 
so far remained neutral in the ongoing GCC crisis and 
have demonstrated interest in Jordan’s stability. Trian-
gulation and further cooperation between authorities 
in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and the EU could help mit-
igate the effects of the Gulf crisis on both Jordan’s fi-
nances and political decision-making in Amman. 
From 2011-2018, Jordan suffered from a decline in 
trade revenues and a sharply reduced appetite for 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in the Kingdom. 
Arguably, Amman’s measures to shield its citizens 
from such economic downturns contributed to the 
current level of government debt, which is increas-
ingly unsustainable. In an effort to reduce unem-
ployment, the government employed some addition-
al 12,000 people annually during the past few years. 
This has led to an unprecedented financial burden 
on the government: government debt skyrocketed 
to reach 94 percent of the country’s GDP.48 In 2016, 
Jordan and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
signed a 36-month program to reduce public debt 
to safe levels. By accepting this program, Amman 
agreed to implement neoliberal austerity measures, 
reforming public sector hiring practices, increasing 
taxes, and cutting pensions. Such measures led to a 
decrease in ordinary Jordanians’ standards of living 
48 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan won’t impose new taxes in new 2020 budget – finance minister,” Reuters, November 21, 2019 <https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-jordan-economy-budget/jordan-wont-impose-new-taxes-in-new-2020-budget-finance-minister-idUSKBN1XV2KW> (accessed December 11, 
2019). 
49 Suha Ma’ayeh and Margherita Stancati, “Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and U.A.E. Pledge $2.5 Billion Aid to Jordan,” The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2018 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-kuwait-and-u-a-e-pledge-2-5-billion-in-aid-to-jordan-1528685116> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
50 “Etihad Credit Insurance, Jordan’s Loan Guarantee Corporation partner to strengthen trade relations,” Gulfnews.com, June 23, 2019 <https://gulfnews.
com/business/etihad-credit-insurance-jordans-loan-guarantee-corporation-partner-to-strengthen-trade-relations-1.64788396> (accessed December 11, 
2019).
and caused country-wide protests which reached 
their peak in 2018, forcing King Abdullah II to oust his 
Prime Minister and prompting Omar Al-Razzaz, Jor-
dan’s new Prime Minister, to halt austerity reforms. 
The protest, originally caused by economic griev-
ances, developed into a major legitimacy test for Jor-
dan’s royal family and government. Despite the risk 
of triggering more protests, Jordan cannot postpone 
cuts in government spending indefinitely. All eco-
nomic indicators point to the further deterioration 
of Amman’s finances for the 2019-2020 period. In this 
context, economic cooperation with the countries of 
the GCC has, so far, allowed Jordan to largely resist 
IMF pressure to implement unpopular fiscal auster-
ity measures. Due to its ongoing financial instability, 
Jordan is likely to increasingly depend on aid and in-
vestments coming from GCC states.
KSA-Qatar-UAE: Economic Leverage and Political 
Conditionality 
The relationship between Jordan and KSA is the lon-
gest strategic partnership that Amman enjoys in the 
Gulf. The size of KSA’s economy and its interests in 
Jordan mean that Riyadh is an increasingly important 
player in supporting Amman’s finances. For instance, 
in June 2018, it was KSA’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz 
Al-Saud who orchestrated a USD 2.5 billion aid pack-
age for protest-hit Jordan, financed by KSA, Kuwait, 
and the UAE.49 The economies of Riyadh and Amman 
are increasingly interconnected. Of the 750,000 Jor-
danians working around the world and transferring 
money and savings to Jordan, some 400,000 reside in 
Saudi Arabia. Jordanian remittances are estimated to 
account for some ten percent of Amman’s GDP. The 
UAE, as recently as June 2019, prompted a stronger 
involvement of UAE businesses in Jordan via the sup-
port of the Etihad Credit Insurance (ECI), Abu Dha-
bi’s Federal Credit Insurance Company.50 Qatar is al-
so a popular work destination for Jordanian nationals 
and the annual trade volume between the two coun-
tries is valued at over USD 400 million. In addition, 
Doha promoted its own financial support package, 
pledging USD 500 million in economic aid, including 
10,000 job openings for Jordanian nationals in Qatar. 
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Gulf states often use economic aid as a soft power 
instrument to promote relations and enhance their 
influence in other countries. Until June 2017, when 
the intra-GCC opposition from KSA, Bahrain, and 
the UAE towards Qatar erupted,51 this was not a ma-
jor concern, as Amman could accept aid from all Gulf 
countries without having to consider the relations 
among the various donors. However, the intra-GCC 
dispute Gulf (with Qatar on one side, and KSA and 
the UAE on the other) has put Jordan in a difficult 
position. The structure of its economic ties evidenc-
es how problematic it would be for Amman to accept 
aid involving political conditions that include sever-
ing economic and financial ties to either the Saudi 
and Emirati-led bloc, or Qatar.
To contextualize, Amman had downgraded its diplo-
matic representation to Qatar in June 2017 in solidar-
ity with the decision of two of its main donors – KSA 
and the UAE – to cut all ties to Doha. In July 2019, as 
its economic situation continued to deteriorate, the 
Hashemite Kingdom, at the risk of irritating Riyadh 
and Abu Dhabi, appointed a new ambassador to Do-
ha and accepted the nomination of Saud bin Nass-
er bin Jasem Al-Thani as Qatar’s ambassador to Am-
man.52 This signals Jordan’s need to cooperate with 
the largest possible number of donors amid its on-
going financial struggle. However, the GCC crisis has 
deeply divided the and the two blocs are increasing-
ly competing for influence in several countries in the 
Middle East. As the intra-GCC diplomatic rift contin-
ues with no end in sight, Jordan will be increasingly 
pushed towards accepting political conditions in ex-
change for economic relief.
Beyond Jordan - Third Parties in the Intra-GCC 
Crisis
In this context, the role of other regional actors 
which have been supporting Amman, have consid-
erable stakes in ensuring a stable future for Jordan, 
and are not entangled in the GCC crisis, is import-
ant. In particular, Kuwait and Oman have a history 
of cooperation with Jordan. Kuwait City and Muscat 
are also important economic partners of the Hash-
emite Kingdom. Kuwait has invested significantly in 
Jordan’s economy while Oman has increased its im-
ports from Amman and seeks to develop a compre-
51 “Qatar Crisis: What you need to know,” BBC News, July 19, 2017 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757> (accessed December 11, 
2019). 
52 “King of Jordan Receives Credentials of Qatar’s Ambassador,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 8, 2019 <https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-
news/details/2019/09/08/king-of-jordan-receives-credentials-of-qatar’s-ambassador> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
53 Giuseppe Dentice, “Kuwair and Oman, Mediators of the Gulf,” Strade, November 30, 2017 <https://www.stradeonline.it/monografica/3211-kuwait-and-
oman-mediators-of-the-gulf> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
hensive and integrated trade relation with both Jor-
dan and the EU.
Kuwait and Oman are the only GCC states not 
aligned in the Gulf crisis and that are trying to ne-
gotiate and settle the differences between the Sau-
di-Emirati-led bloc and Qatar. Kuwait City, in par-
ticular, has emerged as the most proactive mediator 
in the intra-Arab controversy. GCC unity is key for a 
small state bordering an unstable Iraq to the north 
and increasingly internally affected by sectarian ten-
sions. Muscat has offered support to Kuwait in light 
of its status as patient international mediator in cri-
ses theatres53 in and around the Gulf, such as Yemen 
and the Iranian nuclear dossier. 
Kuwait and Oman as Potential Partners for the EU 
Brussels is increasingly concerned that instabili-
ty in Jordan could hinder efforts to cooperate with 
Amman against terrorism and to alleviate the suf-
fering of refugees. The ongoing chaos within Syria 
and Iraq’s Al-Anbar province has pushed many to es-
cape to Jordan, and the EU has already had to inter-
vene to financially support refugee programs inside 
the Hashemite Kingdom. The 2002 EU-Jordan As-
sociation Agreement – recently improved in 2018 - 
demonstrates that Brussels considers Amman as an 
important trade partner. The EU also worries that 
the Gulf crisis could reduce and further condition 
the financial aid that Amman needs. 
Brussels and Kuwait City share several regional con-
cerns, such as the need to mediate an end to the 
GCC crisis, the need to uphold a two-state solution 
for the Israel-Palestine conflict, and they are already 
Kuwait and the EU have acted 
with limited coordination  
with regard to Jordan’s 
financial crisis
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cooperating to reduce the ongoing instability in Iraq. 
On those issues, EU and Kuwaiti officials have al-
ready demonstrated, both at UN forums and during 
the Kuwait-organized donors’ conference for the re-
construction of Iraq, that they are capable of cooper-
ating effectively. More recently, in July 2019, the EU 
opened a delegation to Kuwait, paving the way for 
closer ties.54 With regard to Jordan’s financial crisis, 
Kuwait and the EU have, so far, acted with limited 
coordination. This has limited the positive impact of 
their efforts, despite the EU’s allocation of some USD 
200 million in aid for Jordan in July 2019.55 Kuwait, on 
its part, granted USD 1 billion to fund projects in ag-
riculture, energy, infrastructure, health, and trans-
portation inside Jordan, in addition to financing a 
third of the USD 2.5 billion economic package orga-
nized by Saudi Arabia. EU cooperation with Kuwait 
on Jordan is also likely to pay long-term dividends 
due to the strategic nature of Kuwait’s commitments 
to the Hashemite Kingdom. Kuwait is the top foreign 
investor in Jordan, with USD 18 billion invested be-
fore 201856 in the tourism, industry, banking, real-es-
tate, and telecommunication sectors. Kuwait also 
54 “European Union opens a new delegation in Kuwait City,” European Union External Action, July 14, 2019 <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/65425/european-union-opens-new-delegation-kuwait-city_en> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
55 “Jordan,” European Commission, 2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/international-
economic-relations/enlargement-and-neighbouring-countries/neighbouring-countries-eu/neighbourhood-countries/jordan_en> (accessed December 11, 
2019). 
56 Mahmoud Bushehir, “Kuwait PM’s visit to Jordan help take ties to new heights,” Kuwait News Agency, February 9, 2019 <https://www.kuna.net.kw/
ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=2776878&language=ar> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
57 “Jordan, Oman discuss measures to boost trade cooperation,” The Jordan Times, March 10, 2018 <https://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-
oman-discuss-measures-boost-trade-cooperation> (accessed December 11, 2019). 
58 “Jordan economic zones,” Middle East Business Intelligence, August 22, 2013 <https://www.meed.com/jordan-economic-zones/> (accessed December 
11, 2019). 
holds USD 1.3 billion in liquid assets at Jordan’s Cen-
tral Bank (more than KSA and the UAE combined).
Unlike Kuwait, Oman tends not to provide assistance 
via FDI. However, by increasing its imports from Am-
man, Muscat can provide a much-needed lifeline to 
Jordan’s producers. The Sultanate of Oman is keen 
to establish closer commercial ties with Jordan and 
EU countries alike. For instance, Muscat and Amman 
are already cooperating on the potential establish-
ment of a maritime route to better connect the Gulf 
with Europe. Oman is currently working to remove 
all obstacles to Jordan’s exports towards the Oman 
market.57 The Sultanate is expected to increase its 
import of Jordan’s minerals, such as potassium and 
phosphates, agricultural products including fertil-
izers and vegetables, and pharmaceutical products. 
Oman’s expertise and the success story related to its 
Duqm Special Economic Zone could also benefit the 
development of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, 
established inside Jordan in 2001.58
Figure 3: Jordan’s Exports to Oman 2008-2018






Source: Trading Economics, 2019*
* “Jordan Exports to Oman,” Trading Economics, 2019 <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/exports/oman> (accessed December 11, 2019).
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Recommendations
The EU and Jordanian authorities have much to gain 
from facilitating and contributing to Kuwait’s and 
Oman’s efforts to strengthen Jordan’s economy. By 
relying more on financial aid from the EU, Kuwait, 
and Oman, Jordan would increase its leverage when 
negotiating further aid and trade agreements, even 
with important donors that are increasingly keen to 
attach conditions, such as KSA, Qatar, and the UAE. 
The EU is likely to consider an economically more 
stable Jordan, not constrained by other donors’ po-
litical demands, as an increasingly attractive partner 
to promote its interests in the Arab Levant and the 
wider Middle East.
In this context, decisive and coordinated measures 
by countries that retain important stakes in Jordan, 
that have demonstrated their ability and the inter-
est to coordinate in the past, and which have the ca-
pabilities to improve the situation on the ground will 
likely benefit all parties involved. 
 - Use joint EU-Kuwait direct investments to support 
enterprises inside Jordan
The EU and Kuwait have already considerably in-
vested in Jordan’s economy with limited results. Joint 
targeted initiatives could pay more dividends than 
individual efforts. This could be the case of a joint-
ly financed fund to ensure banking opportunities, 
support loans, and the bankability of Jordan’s small 
and medium-sized enterprises. The project could 
be financed with the establishment of an ad hoc aid 
fund co-financed by the EU and Kuwait. By doing so, 
Brussels and Kuwait City would contribute to im-
proving Amman’s economic resilience in the medium 
to long-term by reducing the country’s unemploy-
ment and strengthening its private sector.
 - Encourage Omani imports from Jordan
The increasing volume of trade between Jordan and 
Oman is proving to be an important lifeline for Jor-
dan’s exports and manufacturing industry. The EU 
should encourage and incentivize Oman to main-
tain and then increase the current level of engage-
ment with Amman. Firstly, this could be done by es-
tablishing a triple‐A supply chain between the EU, 
Jordan, and Oman. This would allow preferential ac-
cess to the EU market for Jordanian products that 
are then treated or re-worked in Oman. Secondly, 
investments to modernize Jordan’s transport infra-
structure would benefit Jordan’s exports in gener-
al and the Amman-Muscat commercial exchange. In 
addition, Jordan’s exports to Oman and other mar-
kets would benefit if Jordan’s manufacturers could 
access EU businesses’ expertise on how to address 
importers’ needs. 
 - Bridge the intra-GCC rift 
The negative impact of the intra-GCC crisis on both 
the stability of Jordan and the prospect of a com-
prehensive EU-GCC trade agreement suggests that 
Brussels should increase its engagement with coun-
tries that are seeking to mediate between the Sau-
di and Emirati-led bloc and Qatar. Such engagement 
could come in the form of explicit support and par-
ticipation in all future initiatives, especially those led 
by Kuwait and Oman, to end the GCC standoff. 
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TRUMP’S PEACE PLAN AND 
JORDAN’S WOES
Suha Ma’ayeh
* Note: The editorial closure date was 22.11.2019
As the Trump administration has yet to unveil the po-
litical aspects of a peace plan meant to end the de-
cades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jordan, which 
shares the longest border with Israel and hosts the larg-
est Palestinian refugee population, finds itself in a pre-
carious situation. The Trump administration’s appar-
ent move away from the two-state solution and Israel’s 
threats to annex large portions of the West Bank will 
deprive the Palestinians of a viable state. This threatens 
Jordan’s key interests, which include the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusa-
lem as its capital and maintaining the Hashemite Cus-
todianship over Jerusalem’s holy sites. However, Am-
man, which depends heavily on financial aid from the 
US and its Arab Gulf allies, will face pressure to accept 
Trump’s so-called deal of the century. If it refuses to co-
operate with its allies, the consequences could include 
cuts to financial aid, potentially resulting in instabili-
ty. As Jordan’s stability remains a lynchpin for regional 
security, the EU and its member states should support 
Jordan’s position in rejecting Trump’s peace plan and 
continue upholding the two-state solution in order to 
support Jordan’s stability and the broader region. The 
EU should also increase financial aid to help Jordan’s 
economy mitigate the impact of potential aid cuts. The 
aid should be linked to political reforms to support the 
county’s long-term stability. Reform is especially ur-
gent in light of the potential failure of a two-state solu-
tion, which will only exacerbate existing grievances.
Jordan’s Concerns over Trump’s Peace Plan 
President Trump’s departure from decades of US 
policy has raised alarm in Jordan, a key partner for 
the EU in a region beset by uncertainty. The new di-
rection includes the recognition of Jerusalem as the 
capital of Israel, defunding the UN Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) – which provides basic services to 
registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank – the rec-
ognition of Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, 
and most recently, legitimizing Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank. Additionally, according to a recent 
59 Zaha Hassan et al., “Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan Is in the Works. What Does the Region Think?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 24, 2019 
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/24/trump-s-middle-east-peace-plan-is-in-works.-what-does-region-think-pub-79365> (accessed December 11, 2019).
60 “Protection in Jordan,” UNRWA, March 2018 <https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-jordan> (accessed December 3, 2019).
61 “Jordan,” UNHCR Fact Sheet, June 2019 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70161.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2019).
62 Ibid.
report by the Carnegie Endowment, the two-state 
solution, which Jordan strongly advocates, might be 
abandoned.59 Moreover, if the new Israeli govern-
ment acts on its promises and annexes all West Bank 
settlements, it will deal a blow to the peace process. 
Those dynamics make it increasingly difficult for the 
two-state solution – Jordan’s overwhelmingly pre-
ferred outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – 
to materialize. 
Jordan’s main fear is that the peace plan would re-
solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at its own ex-
pense and turn it into a de facto alternative home-
land for Palestinians. More than fifty percent of 
Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, including 
2.2 million Palestinian refugees registered with the 
UNRWA.60 If Jordan were asked to resettle or absorb 
more refugees, it would further upset the country’s 
delicate demographic balance towards the Palestin-
ian majority. Jordan already hosts the second largest 
refugee population per capita worldwide, according 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR).61 There are currently 662,569 Syri-
an refugees, 67,527 Iraqi refugees, 14,654 Yemeni ref-
ugees, 6,141 Sudanese refugees, 775 Somali refugees, 
and 1,710 from other nationalities residing in Jordan.62 
Jordan is also concerned that it might be pushed to 
assume an administrative role in governing parts of 
the West Bank. In fact, Jordan is cautious and does 
not want to assume the role of a proxy for Israel. 
Those concerns are deeply rooted in Jordanian pol-
itics. In 1988, these anxieties prompted the late King 
Hussein to adopt a decision to sever administrative 
and legal ties with the West Bank, which was part of 
Jordan from 1948 to 1967, so that the Palestinian Lib-
eration Organization would be the sole and legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinians. The fate of 
Jerusalem is also central to Jordan, given its concern 
that the peace plan would alter its status as the cus-
todian of the holy sites, a Hashemite legacy since 
1924 administered by consecutive kings. The Hash-
emites trace their direct lineage to the Prophet Mo-
hammad, a source of religious legitimacy to enhance 
their rule.
For his part, King Abdullah has reacted angrily to the 
potential risks the peace plan poses for his country. 
In a meeting with dignitaries in Zarqa in March this 
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year, he said: “No to an alternative homeland, no set-
tlement and no meddling with the Hashemite custo-
dianship over Jerusalem.”63 Such statements were in-
tended in part to assuage restive citizens who fear 
that the monarchy will sell out the Palestinian cause. 
The King has also stepped up his political rhetoric at 
home and abroad, affirming his country’s position in 
support of a two-state solution. Jordan sees the two-
state solution – which guarantees the establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state within the June 
1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital in ac-
cordance with the Arab Peace Initiative – as the only 
path to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
In his address to the UN General Assembly in Sep-
tember 2019, King Abdullah warned that the alterna-
tive to a two-state solution would be one state, seg-
regated, with unequal laws. He said it “is a formula 
for enduring conflict, not a path to stability, security, 
and peace.”64 As a custodian, the King added that he 
was bound by a special duty to protect Jerusalem’s 
Islamic and Christian holy sites. With Israeli policies 
shifting further towards the right, it is unlikely that 
the two-state solution will see a breakthrough. King 
Abdullah further warned that annexing the West 
Bank settlements would have a major impact on Is-
raeli-Jordanian as well as Egyptian-Israeli relations, 
since they are the only two Arab countries that have 
peace treaties with Israel. 
Domestic and External Pressures
The country has its share of problems which makes 
it difficult to stand up against Trump’s peace plan. 
The economy has hit its worst rough patch. Public 
debt stands at 94 percent of GDP, poverty is on the 
rise, and unemployment has reached 19 percent.65 
It remains particularly high for youth (42.3 percent) 
and women (23.3 percent). The influx of 1.3 million 
Syrians has placed additional pressure on the coun-
try’s scant resources. Since the country is heavily re-
liant on foreign aid from oil-rich Gulf states and the 
63 “King: Jerusalem is a red line, my position on it is unwavering and all my people are with me,” King Abdullah of Jordan, March 20, 2019 <https://kingabdullah.
jo/en/news/king-jerusalem-red-line-my-position-it-unwavering-and-all-my-people-are-me> (accessed December 3, 2019).
64 “King delivers Jordan’s address at UN, says continued occupation of Palestinian territory a global moral tragedy,” King Abdullah of Jordan, September 24, 2019 
<https://kingabdullah.jo/en/news/king-delivers-jordan’s-address-un-says-continued-occupation-palestinian-territory-global-moral> (accessed December 11, 
2019).
65 “Jordan,” IMF Country Report No. 19/127, May 2019 <https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1JOREA2019001.ashx 1JOREA2019001.pdf> 
(accessed December 3, 2019).
66 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Hundreds of Jordanian Islamists protest against Trump peace plan,” Reuters, June 21, 2019 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-
palestinians-jordan-protests/hundreds-of-jordanian-islamists-protest-against-trump-peace-plan-idUSKCN1TM1QQ> (accessed December 3, 2019).
67 “Photos: Jordanians demonstrate near 4th Circle against Bahrain workshop,” Roya News, June 26, 2019 <https://en.royanews.tv/news/17896/Photos--
Jordanians-demonstrate-near-4th-Circle-against-Bahrain-workshop> (accessed December 3, 2019).
68 “New U.S.-Jordan Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Foreign Assistance to Jordan,” U.S. Embassy in Jordan, February 14, 2018 <https://jo.usembassy.
gov/new-u-s-jordan-memorandum-understanding-bilateral-foreign-assistance-jordan-2/?_ga=2.203994009.823068067.1576057392-531458947.1575365587> 
(accessed December 11, 2019). 
69 Suha Ma’ayeh and Margherita Stancati, “Saudia Arabia, Kuwait and U.A.E. Pledge $2.5 Billion in Aid to Jordan,” The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2018 <https://
www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-kuwait-and-u-a-e-pledge-2-5-billion-in-aid-to-jordan-1528685116> (accessed December 3, 2019).
US, it fears its allies will push it into making painful 
concessions that would make Jordan an alternative 
homeland for Palestinians. This could lead to a melt-
down and ignite identity-based tensions between 
East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians.
There is a shared sentiment in Jordan against the 
peace plan, from the top levels to ordinary citi-
zens. Protests took place against Jordan’s participa-
tion in the Bahrain conference, where Jared Kush-
ner launched the economic part of the peace plan 
this summer. However, these were not mass pro-
tests. Jordanian Islamists marched in the capital af-
ter Friday prayers, denounced Washington’s peace 
plan, and demanded that the government boycott 
the conference.66 On June 25, dozens of Jordanians 
protested near the prime minister’s office, rejecting 
the Bahrain conference and the peace plan.67
Under pressure, Amman participated in Bahrain, but 
sent a low-level delegation. After the event, Jordan 
avoided direct criticism of the conference and there 
was hardly any coverage involving the country’s par-
ticipation in local media. King Abdullah has also 
avoided direct criticism of the peace plan but con-
tinued to urge the US and the international commu-
nity to support the two-state solution. King Abdul-
lah cannot risk upsetting the Trump administration 
and his Gulf allies. The US is the single largest do-
nor of assistance to Jordan. Last year, the US signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with Jordan com-
mitting to providing no less than USD 1.275 bil-
lion per year in US bilateral foreign assistance for 
five years.68 Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries 
pledged a USD 2.5 billion aid package in support of 
Jordan’s monarchy in 2018,69 following large-scale 
protests over tax hikes. 
This aid, however, comes with strings attached. It 
largely consists of loans in the form of deposits. The 
aid package provides neither immediate aid nor ho-
listic long-term support and can be withdrawn at 
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any time.70 Losing access to this foreign aid would 
have severe consequences for Jordan. It would inten-
sify economic hardship and potentially lead to polit-
ical instability. The government would not be able to 
pay its debts, including the salaries of its employees, 
and its credit ratings would decline. While interna-
tional agencies have maintained Jordan’s rating out-
look as “stable,”71 it remains challenged by high public 
debt, slow growth, and the risk of domestic and re-
gional turmoil. 
A further challenge for Jordan is that its region-
al standing is diminishing, which makes it less like-
ly that allies will continue to pour money into the 
country without concessions in return. Wedged be-
tween Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, Jordan’s 
strategic position has allowed it to assume a pivot-
al role as a buffer between these countries. But as 
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are dealing direct-
ly with Israel, Jordan no longer functions as an inter-
locutor between Israeli and Arab Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. Besides, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) support the peace 
plan, have forged closer ties with the Trump admin-
istration, and see eye to eye on foreign policy issues, 
including the threat that Iran poses to their states 
and the region. 
In its attempts to carve out a more independent for-
eign policy, Amman may have upset its Gulf allies 
when it refused to sever its ties completely with Qa-
tar in 2017. In the summer of 2019, Amman appointed 
a new envoy to Doha. Furthermore, Jordan is trying 
to send a signal to Saudi Arabia that it does not want 
70 Ibid.
71 “Jordan – Credit Rating,” Trading Economics, 2019 <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/rating> (accessed December 3, 2019). 
72 Dale Gavlak, “Jordan Seeks Middle Ground in Mideast Rift,” VOA News, August 14, 2019 <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/jordan-seeks-middle-
ground-mideast-rift> (accessed December 3, 2019).
73 “Rouhani, Jordan’s king meet for 1st time in 15 years,” PressTV, May 19, 2108 <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/05/19/562235/Iran-Jordan-OIC> 
(accessed December 3, 2019).
74 “King congratulates Iran on Nowruz new year,” Jordan News Agency, March 23, 2019 <http://petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.
jsp?ID=14238&lang=en&name=en_news> (accessed December 3, 2019). 
75 “Jordan. Partly Free,” Freedom in the World 2019, Freedom House, 2019 <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/jordan> (accessed 
December 3, 2019).
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to be part of the Iran-Saudi rift. When Jordan re-
called its ambassador from Iran, the Iranian ambas-
sador stayed in Amman.72 King Abdullah also shook 
hands with Iran’s president during a special sum-
mit in May of the Organization of Islamic Coopera-
tion (OIC) in Turkey.73 He also sent cables of congrat-
ulations to Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and President Has-
san Rouhani on the occasion of the Nowruz new year 
celebrations in March this year.74
The lack of political reform adds to existing griev-
ances. Laws stifling the freedom of expression and 
the freedom of assembly, prompted by security con-
cerns, persist. In fact, Jordan is rated only partly free 
by Freedom House, which assesses the condition of 
political rights and civil liberties around the world.75 
Human Rights Watch has also criticized Jordan for 
increasingly targeting political and anti-corruption 
activists on charges that violate the right to free ex-
pression.76 Since mid-March 2019, authorities have 
detained over a dozen people, most of whom are 
linked to a loose coalition of political activists across 
the country known as the Hirak, as well as journal-
ists, for public criticism of Jordanian leaders and pol-
icies.77 Trump’s reversal of four decades of US foreign 
policy and the lack of progress in the peace process 
will only deepen the anger and frustration at a time 
when pent-up grievances could mobilize the silent 
majority onto the streets.
EU-Jordanian Cooperation and Mutual Interests
Jordan’s stability remains a lynchpin for regional se-
curity. Hence, current developments are against the 
EU’s own interest. Jordan is a key partner for Europe 
and a recipient of substantial EU aid. Germany is Jor-
dan’s second largest bilateral donor after the US. 
Despite its meagre resources, Jordan has assumed 
a pivotal role in the region’s security. Its pro-west-
ern foreign policy, diplomacy that is constructive in 
nature, and commitment to promoting peace and 
stability, make it an important partner for the EU. 
Jordan also cooperates with the EU on counter-ter-
The lack of political reform 
adds to existing grievances
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rorism and constitutes a bulwark against extrem-
ists from Syria and Iraq. Jordan and the EU see eye to 
eye on the Israel-Palestine issue and advocate a two-
state solution. They also share the same views on the 
war in Syria and support UN Security Council Reso-
lution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire and a politi-
cal settlement. 
Jordan is also an important partner in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, enforced since 2002, which 
seeks to advance a political dialogue, boost trade, 
and promote cooperation in a wide array of sectors. 
Moreover, the EU appreciates Jordan’s role in hosting 
at least 660,000 registered Syrian refugees. The EU’s 
support to Jordan has helped the country cope with 
the Syrian crisis. Since 2011 and to date, the EU has 
spent more than EUR 2 billion in Jordan on differ-
ent projects in the fields of health, education, wom-
en’s empowerment, private sector development, live-
lihoods, water, sanitation and health, macro-financial 
assistance, and bilateral assistance, including a trust 
fund in response to the Syrian crisis. In 2016, the EU 
and Jordan adopted a Compact in an attempt to im-
prove the living conditions of both Syrian refugees 
in Jordan and vulnerable host communities.78 As the 
single largest donor to UNRWA, the EU’s support has 
helped Jordan mitigate the impact of the suspen-
sion of US funds. If Jordan’s stability is undermined, 
it would further destabilize the region and could po-
tentially lead to a new wave of migration to the EU.
Recommendations
 - Increase EU member states’ engagement in oppos-
ing Trump’s peace plan
A stronger European engagement in rejecting 
Trump’s peace plan, affirming the two-state solution, 
with an independent and viable Palestinians state, 
and opposing Israel’s expansion of settlements in the 
West Bank, should be priority concerns for the EU. 
Therefore, the EU and its member states should on-
ly agree to a plan that supports the two sate-solution 
based on international law and resist any attempts to 
thwart it. They should also support a solution based 
on UN security resolutions as well as the Arab Peace 
Initiative, among others. Efforts should be made to 
try and enforce UN Security Council resolution 2334, 
which calls on Israel to immediately and completely 
cease all settlement activities in the occupied Pales-
tinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to fully 
respect all of its legal obligations in this regard. The 
78 “EU-Jordan Partnership. The Compact,” European Commission, March 2017 <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/jordan-
compact.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2019).
EU and its member states should also try to jump 
start the peace talks based on the June 4, 1967 lines.
 - Increase financial support, while pressing Jordan to 
pursue genuine political reforms 
The EU and its member states must increase finan-
cial support to help Jordan resist pressure from its 
allies to accept the peace plan. At the same time, the 
EU should use the aid to push for genuine domestic 
reforms to ensure Jordan’s stability. Reforms should 
also include the adoption of a modern election law, 
and the revision of laws that stifle press freedoms 
and the freedom of assembly. 
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